Qadhafi's mafia state

With all the focus on the end of the Qadhafi dictatorship in Libya, it is timely to also ask how Qadhafi managed to stay in power for 42 years, largely unchallenged. The Muftah blog has some interesting commentary on the 'mafia state' created by the Qadhafi family in which civic values were completely absent. Here is an extract:

Symptomatic of how it was run [the state] is an incident in 2009, in which
two of Qadhafi's sons fought each other with military tanks until one of
them forced the other to sell him his shares in a new Coca Cola plant in the
country.

Reflections on the Arab Spring

Rami Khouri has a light and easy summary here on events in the Middle East since the start of the Arab uprisings (how long can people refer to it as the Arab Spring? after all, it's likely to continue in one form or another for years, if not decades.).

The end of Tahrir?

Yesterday, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (#SCAF) finally lost its patience with the ongoing sit-in protest in Tahrir Square and sent in the troops to clear the remnants of the protest movement. SCAF's calculation was based on on the fact that the average Egyptian is now weary of the demonstrations and is craving a return to normal life, and the centre of the Egyptian capital reopened for business. The decision by the liberals and leftist groups on July 8th to 're-occupy' Tahrir until SCAF meets its demands appears to have backfired completely, alienating the majority of the population and forcing a backlash from the diverse Islamist trends. A battle is now underway for the ownership of the revolution.

Marc Lynch has some analysis here.

Palestinian reconciliation ...?

Was the recent accord signed between Fatah and Hamas provoked by a genuine change of heart or merely another consequence of the Arab Spring? ICG delves into the key issues in a new report here.

Jordan: barriers to reform

Suleiman al-Khalidi of Reuters has a good round-up here of the pressures facing Jordan in the current Arab Spring (read: static summer) and the obstructionist policies of the country's old guard to ensure their interests, and not those of the state, remain protected at any cost.

Egypt and Palestine

Helena Cobban has a good piece here on what has, or has not changed in Gaza as a result of the Egyptian uprising.

Lebanon's new government

After 5 months of deadlock, Lebanon has a new government dominated by Hezbollah and its allies. Paul Salem of Carnegie Middle East Centre has some good analysis here.

Obama sticks by Assad, for now

With the situation in Syria getting worse by the day and Bashar al-Assad sanctioning an all out military assault on his own people, one can't help but wonder when the US will begin to take a much stronger line with the Assad regime. As Tony Badran points out on the Foreign Policy blog, "Assad's brutality has already cost him critical relations with three countries that have been instrumental in his efforts to rehabilitate himself in the world: France, Qatar, and Turkey". Even Israel's Defence Minister Ehud Barak, has stated on record that Assad "has lost his legitimacy" - though I still suspect the Israelis would still prefer the devil they know to protect their northern border.

But so far Washington's position has remained unchanged, i.e., limited sanctions and calls for reform. For the Obama administration, already struggling with multiple challenges to its Middle East security structure, the consequences of the Assad regime falling and the regional turmoil that would inevitable follow are just too big to contemplate. However, with the level of regime brutality escalating by the day, this position is becoming increasingly untenable. The line from Washington has been that it has no leverage. This is not entirely true. For a start, the US could withdraw its Ambassador in Damascus and declare the Syrian regime illegitimate. This would have a significant impact in sending a strong message to the protesters, the international community and the regime. Strong US leadership would result in more galvanised international action.

Strong US leadership in confronting the Assad regime has worked in the past. International pressure led by the US in 2005 resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which forced the Syrians to pull out of Lebanon . The circumstances, of course, were different and the regime was facing external rather than internal challenges to its rule. But it did demonstrate one thing: that the threat of force is the only thing that the Assad clan understands (Syria was worried that it would become the next target after Iraq for the pro-Israel neocons in Washington). This is not a call for military intervention, but rather a clearer and consistent US strategy in the region, which has been badly lacking since the start of the Arab uprisings.

A picture paints a thousand words

Who's been a naughty boy then? Crown Prince of Bahrain, Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, is looking very nervous before a none too pleased Hilary Clinton during a 'brief' meeting on June 7th. Relations between the two allies have become somewhat fraught in recent weeks as the al-Khalifi regime has been busy proving what a brutal US client it really is, even going as far as to running state security court trials for doctors accused of 'treating injured protesters'. Read Simon Henderson's recent analysis here.

Nasrallah backs Assad's repression

Hassan Nasrallah broke his long, long silence on Syria on May 25 and with it probably his reputation throughout the entire Middle East by backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's brutal repression of his people. In a 2008 Zogby poll Nasrallah was voted the most popular leader in the Arab world, a significant achievement for a Shia leader in a Sunni-dominated region. After his recent comments in support of Assad, however, i doubt he will retain this position for much longer.

I think it's fair to say that Ranna Kabbani's post on the al-Bab blog just about sums up the feelings of betrayal felt by the Syrian people as they witness one of their former heroes and self-styled champion of the oppressed side against them in their time of need. Describing Nasrallah's speech, Kabbani states:

"As ever, it took on the mythic pageantry of a Passion Play. Nasrallah began by urging his many listeners to suffer the few hours of their wait in the burning sun to hear him, as a way of sharing the burning experience of all those who suffered and sacrificed so greatly to bring this occasion about.

"He then broke his long, long silence on the popular intifada in Syria, only to side totally and categorically with the killers in the Syrian regime. As a Syrian watching this, who knows what great popularity Nasrallah once enjoyed in her country, where photos of him were on display everywhere – making his the only face ever allowed to be added to the Assad iconography of Father, Son and Holy Ghost – or Hafiz, Bashar and the departed Basil – so depravedly and cynically modelled on Christian religious belief. I felt viscerally that something had shifted irrevocably as the chairman uttered his unfortunate words. No wonder that his image was torched almost at once after this speech in Deraa and Muaddamiyya and Homs and Hama and Bou Kamal and other centres of our intifada."

Bahrain: targetting the medics

A Physicians for Human Rights investigation last month into the brutal and systematic abuse of pro-democracy protesters has resulted in some disturbing, yet perhaps predictable, findings.

The reports authors - both medical doctors - conducted interviews with 47 medical workers, patients and other eyewitnesses and corroborated testimonies by conducting physical examinations of beaten and tortured protesters, as well as deaths in custody. The report also produced strong evidence that the al-Khalifah regime had systematically targetted medical staff, including abductions of doctors, some of whom were taken from their homes in the middle of the night by security forces. The report concluded that the Bahraini authorities:

• Attacked ambulances; removed ambulance medics, and forced them to give their uniforms to police who then posed as medics to get closer to protesters;
  


• Prevented ambulances from reaching people who needed medical care;



• Blockaded health facilities and obstructed delivery of care;



• Militarized the country's main tertiary care hospital, preventing medical staff and patients from entering or leaving;



• Destroyed medical records;



• Abducted medical professionals, detained and held them incommunicado;



• Hunted down patients wounded in protests by searching medical centers and setting up police check points;



• Humiliated, beat, and tortured patients while in medical centers;



• Forcibly discharged patients in need of urgent medical care.

Of course, Bahrain's security forces are the backbone of the al-Khalifah regime with large numbers of their personnel recruited from other countries, including Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen (a main reason why the GCC's club of Kings is making overtures to Jordan and its well trained security forces). Bahrain's Shia majority, meanwhile, is mostly excluded from positions in the security forces.

Assad plays Israel card

With mounting pressure domestically, the Syrian regime cynically played its Israel card yesterday by allowing Palestinians commemorating al-Nakba day (meaning catastrophe) - the day Israel was created in 1948 - to storm the border fences and become targets for Israeli bullets. Since 1974, the Syrians have guarded the border closely, fearing Israeli reprisals for any possible Palestinian guerrilla activity in the region.

Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric and championing of the Palestinian cause, a quiet border on the Syrian front (of course this does not apply to Lebanon which has paid dearly for Syria's attempts to regain the Golan Heights through supporting Hezbollah) has been a top priority of the Assad dynasty over the past 38 years. In fact, you could argue that Syria's ability to maintain a peaceful border with Israel has been too successful, leading the Israelis to conclude that there is no need to enter peace talks to resolve the issue of the occupied territories, under Israeli control since 1967. Yesterday's border incursions, therefore, where a typically crude attempt by the Assad regime to remind Israel, the US, Lebanon and Jordan of the sought of chaos that could unfold if the ruling Allawite clan in Damascus where to fall and to buy time for its brutal repression. But will it work?

The problem with this strategy for Assad is that it also highlights to the US and Israel how far the Allawite clan in Damascus is willing to go to retain power. The old saying "there is nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal" clearly comes to mind and no doubt will provoke some debate in Washington and Tel-Aviv. As such, the tactic may well backfire and lead to the conclusion that the Syrian leader is becoming more of a liability than an asset. Furthermore, with the Syrian regime, despite continuing protests, not under any immediate short term threat of being toppled, it will also raise questions regarding how far Assad would actually go if the Syrian regime where to face a more serious challenge in the future.

Update: Palestine unity deal

Following on from the previous post, Middle East Chanel has an interesting interview with Mustafa Barghouti on the new Palestinian unity deal. Read it here.

Hamas-PA unity accord: a few thoughts

The ripple first tangible ripple effect of the so-called Arab spring on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict revealed itself on Wednesday with the signing of a Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity accord.

After four years of hostility following Hamas' 2006 election victory, the two key Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas have agreed to set up a unified caretaker government which will pave the way for new elections. So after years of animosity and repeated failed attempts to reach a compromise, why now?

Firstly, Egypt's secret role in brokering the agreement appears to be the first clear sign that the country's de facto new ruler and long-time defence chief, Mohammad Tantawi, is far less rigid towards the Islamist movement than his former boss Husni Mubarak. This new position is being driven by pragmatism rather than any love for the Brotherhood and reflects the changed political landscape in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak, which has left the remnant of Mubarak's NDP party and the Islamists in the driving seat - for now.

If and when civilian rule is restored, the military, which controls a big slice of the economy, will want to preserve its privileges and may seek a background role as 'national guardian'. It remains unclear what role the Islamist will play in the future political system. This will depend on how well the Brotherhood performs in the September election. If the group performs well, it will feel emboldened and no doubt seek greater power. In the meantime, all sides will be hedging their bets and the country's military rulers will be looking to build support among the Islamists. The signing of the recent Hamas-PA accord will therefore boost the military's political capital in an uncertain landscape.

Secondly, although the new nuanced regional approach of Egypt towards Hamas and Iran, compared to Mubarak's staunch alliance with the US and Israel, is certainly a factor in bridging the divide between the PA and Hamas, there is also a strong dose of realism on the part of both Palestinian factions. Both must be aware that the so-called Arab Spring may be heading their way and that a failure to move forward may result in a backlash from a Palestinian public fed up with poor governance, bickering and infighting.

For Hamas, the threats on the horizon appear more obvious. After four years in charge of Gaza they have failed to deliver any tangible economic benefits and have ruled over a population largely cut off from the outside world, in main as a result of Israel's cruel blockade. Nevertheless, Gaza's population will not indefinitely put up with the status-quo. Furthermore, the largely secular-driven Arab uprisings - though Islamist parties may emerge as future benefactors -have largely undermined Hamas' message and portrayed the group as belonging to the past rather than the future. This image will only be reinforced by Hamas' alliance with Iran and Syria. Both states have resorted to severe repression in order to quell their own opposition movements and images of largely Sunni Muslim Syrian protesters being shot in the streets by an Allawi-dominated military will not resonate well with the overwhelmingly Sunni Palestinian popualtion.

For the PA, the accord with Hamas appears to be aimed at shoring up its flagging popularity, pleasing the new regime in Egypt, and an attempt to offset challenges to its authority stemming from the Arab spring. More crucially, however, it represents a conviction that any negotiations with Israel so long as Netanyahu is in power are a non-starter. It also signifies the PA's lack of faith in the Obama administration's ability to have any influence over the current Israeli government and the death of the so-called peace process itself.

All eyes will now be on the reaction of the US and the Quartet. Will it once again demand that the new government must recognize Israel and honour the agreements already signed with it? If the quartet sticks to its previous position that Hamas must recognise Israel's right to exist and reject armed struggle then all sides will be back to square one. Mind you, they never got to stage two anyway.

Syria: a state of fear

It's no surprise that many of Syria's minorities are feeling fearful right now as unrest spreads throughout the country. The current minority Allawite regime, for all its ills, has long been viewed as the protector of minority religious rights and the vanguard of a secular (ish) society.

To gauge the current feeling in the country see Joshua Landis' recent post and the myriad of different voices expressing their fears on what may follow Assad, if the regime falls, and that's a big IF.

For more analysis on Syria, see here and here.

Bahrain update

After a month of repressive crackdowns on pro-reform protesters, including the influx of Saudi troops to shore up the al-Khalifah regime, the government in Bahrain appeared to backtrack for the first time on Friday after coming under criticism from Washington. The criticism centred on the government's decision on Thursday to ban the country's main opposition groups, including al-Wefaq, which withdrew its 18 MPs from the 40-seat parliament in February in protest at the government crackdowns.

It appears that the al-Khalifah regime has taken Washington's silence since the start of the protests as a green light for a total crackdown on the opposition. This 'overstepping of the boundaries' has placed the Obama administration - already facing heavy criticism for its inconsistent stance vis-à-vis the Arab uprisings - in a difficult position. The White House is also aware - unlike the hardliners in Bahrain - that banning the main Shia party will only fuel the unrest and further the chances of a more violent insurrection similar to what took place in the 1990s.

Joost Hiltermann of International Crisis Group has a podcast here on the recent unrest.

Egypt: business as usual

In the first case of its kind since the Egyptian uprising against the Mubarak regime, a military court has sentenced an Egyptian blogger to a three year prison term for publishing "false information and "insulting the armed forces". As Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch points out, the "The ruling [against Maikel Nabil]comes at a time when the Egyptian military is drawing very restrictive red lines around permissible speech". Joe Stork goes on to note:

"Since the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power on February 11, the military has arrested at least 200 protesters and tried scores of them before military courts. Over 150 protesters arrested on March 9 after the military forcibly cleared Tahrir Square of protesters were sentenced to prison terms by military tribunals in Cairo's high-security Tora prison and are still being held."

Syria: Riding out the storm

The regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad seems to have weathered the storm, for now. The regime will take comfort that the army and security services (firmly in the hands of Assad's Allawi minority) stayed loyal and the protest movement that briefly flourished in the provinces failed to take route in the country's three major cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Hama.

The conclusion Assad may draw from this is that Syrians - for the time being - prefer stability. The lessons drawn from political disorder in neighbouring Lebanon, Iraq and now Libya have not been lost on a population that is keenly aware of the fragile ethnic and sectarian make-up of their state. The old saying "order under an unjust leader is better than chaos under a just leader" appears to ring true for many Syrians. But while Assad may take comfort from this - and also from tactical support from the US - he should be wary of complacency.

Syria's youth, like the youth all over the Arab world, have spoken. They may not want to plunge the country into civil conflict but they do demand that the regime responds to their legitimate demands for greater political freedoms, accountable government and better economic prospects. They are no longer apathetic and have sent a clear signal to the regime that things need to change to meet their growing aspirations. It seems clear that the Syrian population has changed even if the regime has not. Communications and social media have dragged the country out of its isolation. The open question now is: can the regime respond to these changes?

Joshua Landis has some interesting observations on the recent unrest here and here.

America's Syria conundrum

Not much time for blogging at the moment so I'm going to hand over to long time Syria watcher Patrick Seal who has offered some excellent analysis in Foreign Policy in regards of the dilemma posed by events in Syria to the US and Israel. Personally, I think both states would prefer the status quo - better the devil you know - regardless of the fact that Syria lies at the heart of the so-called Iran axis.

Jordan's Tahrir Square moment

I'm going to leave it Naseem Tarawneh here to provide the full eye-witness account of what took place in Jordan last weekend as hundreds of pro-reform demonstrators came under an orchestrated and sustained attack by regime loyalists during a peaceful sit-in close to the Interior Ministry. Here's an excerpt:

'I am not sure how things spiraled out of control, but from my point of view, having retreated to the neutral area outside the governorate office, I saw two things that contributed to what was about to happen. The first were a series of cars that seemed to be carrying anti-reformists. During the early morning period, these cars were permitted to enter the circle and circle around honking horns and unloading anti-reformists. I use he word “permitted” because all access to the duwar had been cut off by police and the only way these cars (and buses) could get in was either by ramming through the police barricade or being allowed in by the police. This is a very binary conclusion because I really see no other explanation. During that dreadful Friday afternoon, these actions allowed the anti-reformists to grow in numbers. Little did most of the people there know, but there were dozens of cars and buses filled with these people approaching the duwar from the Sports City circle a few kilometers aware.'

All I will add to Naseem's piece is that it says a lot about the insecurity of the Hashemite monarchy that it feels compelled to resort to the crude and inevitably counterproductive strategy of promoting social and ethnic divisions to retain power.

Egypt update

With all the international attention on Libya right now, the first Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have largely faded into the background. The long slog towards democratic change and the nitty gritty of constitutional amendments was never going to be front page news - and i guess the old power networks in both these states are very relieved about that.

Following the referendum, the Egyptian novelist Alaa al-Aswany neatly sums up the state of play in Egypt right now and the danger signs ahead. Read it here.

So what's the Libya endgame?

(AP Photo)

To many, UNSCR 1973 took a long time in coming. The immediate impetus, despite the various conspiracy theories now emerging about a Western plot to grab Libya's energy resources, was to safeguard the citizens of Benghazi from Qaddaffi's advancing army. The Libyan leader, buoyed by military successes in forcing the rebels out of Ajdabiyah and elsewhere, had just hours before the resolution was passed threatened to cleanse Benghazi and show "no mercy". For a leader with a track record of brutality, including the use of foreign mercenaries against his own people, these threats needed to be taken seriously and the international community was right to intervene.

But now the debate has quickly moved on. Apart from the inevitable criticism from the left, who have failed to put forward any credible alternatives to the UN mandated action, already we are beginning to see cracks emerge in the international community and the coalition itself. Yesterday, Russian PM Vladimir Putin compared the military action in Libya to the invasion of Iraq and likened it to the "Crusades", knowing full well the strong impact of this word in the Arab world. China has called for the air strikes to stop. Both Russia and China were among five states that abstained on UNSCR 1973 but nevertheless allowed it to pass. The Arab League, crucial to convincing the Obama administration to throw its support behind the UN resolution, has also wobbled, with its secretary general Amr Moussa voicing criticism before suddenly backtracking, no doubt under political pressure. And now we are hearing that NATO itself is unwilling to take over the operation, with Turkey calling for immediate talks.

There are, of course, good reasons why some of these political actors are wary of supporting the military intervention, even if they either initially signed up or acquiesced to the will of the international community. China, Russia and Turkey have their own restive minorities seeking greater political independence and freedom and however unlikely, would not want a precedence set for liberal interventionism. Likewise, the under pressure dictators of the Arab League are paradoxically attempting to demonstrate their support for their 'Libyan brothers' to appease their own populations in the grip of revolutionary fervour, whilst at the same time becoming increasingly wary of the aims of the coalition in pursuing actual regime change. However, what unites them all is the deep misgivings and an unwillingness to fully commit politically to a project whose aims are obscure and whose success is far from sure. What would have been an easier operation weeks ago has now become considerably more difficult.

As such, the longer the military campaign continues and the more the coalition inevitably gets drags into this conflict the more these cracks will deepen. It is clear that the goal of the US, Britain and France in particular is regime change. Europe does not want to be left with a pariah state on its southern borders ruled by a dictator with a track record in supporting terrorism. The US likewise does not want the headache of dealing with a rogue state that will inevitably seek to revive its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, backed by the country's energy reserves (and China and Russia securing lucrative contracts). Also, if Qaddafi succeeds in suppressing the rebellion there is the danger that other Arab states will follow suit, resulting in more regional instability and the prospect of multiple armed insurrections. On the other hand, if the US is seen to overtly side with the rebels militarily then other opposition movements in the Arab world and possibly the Gulf, will feel more emboldened to challenge their respective regimes. This dilemma - along with the uncertainly of what comes after Qaddafi - goes a long way to explaining the current hedging on the part of the coalition.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1973 the coalition has set about degrading Qaddafi's military capabilities largely under the pretext of humanitarian intervention in the hope that this will be enough to fracture the military while at the same time tip the balance of power in favour of the rebels. It may yet work. So far, however, the signs are less than positive. This is not Afghanistan in 2001 where the US used the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban while providing overwhelming air power. At present, the rebels appear to lack the military organisation and means to take the fight to Qaddafi and a stalemate looks like a distinct possibility. The outcome could well be the partition of Libya and a prolonged conflict, as it seems unlikely that neither side would accept this scenario. Furthermore, would the coalition accept such an outcome? If not, are coalition warplanes going to bomb Qaddafi's forces to clear the route to Tripoli? Too many questions and so few answers. And this is before we even consider what comes next if Qaddafi does fall. Foreign Policy has some analysis here.

Obama resurrects the UN

Like many others, I have been fairly critical of the Obama administration’s policy drift and lack of leadership since the start of the Arab uprisings. And while I still stand by this view in general, the outcome of last night’s vote at the UNSC was a clear victory for Obama’s philosophy of multilateralism and international law over the unilateral policies of the US in recent years. But why did it take so long in coming?

Less than three weeks ago Qaddafi was surrounded by opposition forces. To all intents and purposes it looked like the game was up. But sensing a lack of political will for military intervention on the part of the US in particular the Libyan leader was able to push back. It appears that in the end Obama’s hand was forced. He did not want to be the president on whose watch Qaddafi butchered his people and neither did the US or Europe want a pariah reeking chaos across North Africa and beyond, and possibly resorting the terrorism and reviving his chemical weapons programme in the process.

But there were other considerations. Apart from having no strategical interest in Libya, the US is already fighting wars in two Muslim countries and the Generals and Obama seemed deeply reluctant to take the lead in another. Accordingly, Obama let Britain and France do the running, whilst at the same time refusing to sign up until there was clear Arab and African Union support also. Once the Arab league approved the no-fly zone and later some states – notably Qatar and the UAE – pledged to take part in military operations – Obama and the State Department were in a better position to sell the draft proposal of military intervention to a still skeptical Defense Department, probably on the grounds that US military participation would be minimal. By pursuing this path Obama was also able to achieve solid legal backing for military action and also embolden the UN. In the end it was a clever if rather belated strategy.

Whether it will work or not is another story. There are many possible pitfalls ahead, ranging from Qaddafi making good on his threat to target civilian targets to getting bogged down in a protracted conflict. The Western powers will be hoping that the threat of airstrikes may be enough to force Qaddafi to back down and declare a ceasefire. But if he does declare a ceasefire what next? What counts as a ceasefire? Will Qaddafi’s security forces step aside and allow the Libyan people to express their will through peaceful protests? To do so would mark the endgame for a dictator that remains in denial. And if Qaddafi was to declare a ceasefire would the rebels reciprocate? I doubt it. They are far more likely to march on Tripoli in the belief that they have won. Maybe they have.

On a different note, Marc Lynch has an interesting piece on the Foreign Policy Blog about how Bahrain’s leaders are flaming the flames of sectarianism in order to rally regional allies and maintain a monopoly on power.

Why the Libyan revolution mustn’t fail

As protests continue unabated across large parts of the Arab world, many largely unreported, there is a deep sense that the initial euphoria surrounding the ousting of the Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt is beginning to subside and is giving way to harsh realities and protracted struggles.

In Tunisia and Egypt there has been some cause for optimism (and more recently Morocco). Through sheer persistence and bravery the protesters in both these states have managed to achieve considerable concessions. Bit by bit the old political apparatus in Tunisia is being dismantled and replaced. Just yesterday a Tunisian court dissolved the party of the former president just two days after the country’s interim PM announced a new government that will run the country until elections in July. On Monday, the interior ministry also dissolved the country's secret police service, widely accused of committing human rights abuses. These are significant gains though the future is far from certain.

Meanwhile, In Egypt protesters have kept up the pressure on the military, which has drafted some fairly positive proposals for constitutional amendments which will be put to a referendum, the date of which has yet to be specified. Recent pressure has also succeeded in finally ousting the old guard PM Ahmad Shafiq, and others such as the long standing Foreign Minister Ahmed Abou el-Ghait. More recently protesters have been engaged in a concerted effort to prevent the intelligence services from destroying evidence of alleged human rights abuses. This culminated in the storming of the intelligence headquarters. For anyone vaguely familiar with the Middle East and feared Mukhabarat this is really a momentous event. However, significant challenges lie ahead and despite some of the piecemeal concessions outlined above, the future is also far from certain.

Elsewhere in the region the situation is murkier still. Something of a stalemate appears to have taken place in Algeria, Yemen and Bahrain. As such, the prospect for violence will no doubt increase. In other countries such as Jordan, King Abdullah has responded quickly (though mainly in the form of handouts to his East Bank support base) with yet more promises of reforms whilst at the same time installing a new government headed by a former military and intelligence man whose previous stint in office was marked by electoral fraud, the suppression of freedoms and alleged corruption. As is always the case in Jordan, Abdullah’s promises seldom match reality and Jordanians will remain skeptical until they achieve their main goal: changes to the electoral law and a limit on the King’s executive powers (at least from Jordanians of Palestinian origin). Here the King will probably follow a policy of wait and see and try to stall reforms as much as possible fearing a backlash from East Bankers, who in typical Bedouin fashion have been busy extracting their own concessions .

This brings us to Libya. The outcomes of some of the protests mentioned above and possible future ones in Syria or Saudi Arabia may well hinge on what happens here. Arab leaders, though no friends of Qaddafi, will be watching developments in this North African country very closely and no doubt quietly hoping that Qaddafi succeeds in quelling the uprising. If Qaddafi does manage to remain in power (though personally I’m not sure that either the US or EU can allow this to happen, more cynical voices may well argue it would solve many of America’s problems in dissuading other revolutions in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf) through brutal repression this will send a signal to the other despots in the region that it’s OK to employ the same tactics. Apart from a strong case for intervening on humanitarian grounds, this is one of the main reasons that Qaddafi mustn't be allowed to win.

Egyptian revolutionary humour

Taking a break from the intense political developments in the region here is a sample of Egyptian humour during the 18 days of protests in Tahrir Square as demonstrators waited for the departure of Mubarak.

The poster here reads in Arabic: "Go [Mubarak] before my wife kills me. I've only been married for 20 days".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

This one is from the Egyptian Carpenters Association asking Mubarak: "Tell us Mubarak, what type of glue do you use?".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

And this one reads: "Go [Mubarak] the woman wants to give birth and her child doesn't want to see you".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

And this one reads: Go [Mubarak] my hand is hurting me".

Revolution or strategic maneuvering?

According to the Oxford dictionary definition, a revolution is the "forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system". Given this definition, can we really refer to the mass uprisings in the Arab world as revolutions? Libya may yet prove to be the exception here but I think we need to be very careful before defining the Tunisian and Egyptian models as revolutions yet. Revolutions in progress may be a more accurate description. By defining them as revolutions there is an obvious danger of lending credence to these regimes that real change in the power structures of these states has already taken place when in reality not that much has changed beyond some recycling of old faces, particularly in Egypt where the Mubarak cabinet (bar a few exceptions) along with the emergency laws etc ... remain firmly in place.

Of course, it's early days and the speed with which events have been unfolding makes it difficult to keep up. But despite the remarkable achievements and courage of the Arab publics it remains a fact that the key slogan of the uprisings - al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam (the people demand the fall of the regime) is a long way from being achieved in any of the states (though again, Libya may prove the exception). The key challenge for the protest movements now is to maintain and sustain the momentum whilst working to institutionalise their gains and transform them into a system of pluralistic and democratic politics. This will prove a difficult task given the weak and fragmented nature of the various opposition parties which are pitted against the wily, organised regimes that remain firmly entrenched and as such have a significant advantage in shaping the future 'reform process'.

In Egypt in particular, the military - which has effectively been in power since 1952 - is at present in a strong position to shape the outcome. And so far, there have been precious few signs that it is committed to real reform with a real absence of confidence building measures. Such measures could include an immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the freeing of political prisoners and respecting freedom of assembly and the rights of independent trade unions. The lack of progress is hardly surprising. The military has so far played an ambivalent role and its primary goal has been retaining stability while preserving its political influence and business interests. After all, this is the very reason it eventually and reluctantly decided that Mubarak should go.

Some clues to how far the military is committed to real reform will soon be revealed and will include: the level of input from opposition parties into the new constitution and the parameters of the new electoral law. The timescale for reforms will also prove telling. If the military seeks to rush through these changes the likelihood is that it's main aim is to generally preserve the status quo, while introducing slightly more opposition voices into the new parliament, particularly ones that are susceptible to cooption.

Past examples of reforms in the Arab world do not bode well. In 1989 Algeria experienced widespread civil unrest that forced the regime into constitutional reforms and allowed greater freedoms. However, when the elections of 1992 resulted in a landslide for the Islamist opposition the government quickly backtracked and cancelled the result. The result was a bloody civil war and one that Algerians will not want to repeat. Also in 1989, Jordan ended 23-years of martial law in response to growing instability in the regime's tribal heartlands, restored parliamentary democracy and extended freedom of assembly and expression. However, after appeasing the protesters the Hashemite monarchy quickly backtracked and introduced a raft of temporary laws to undermine the brief democratic gains.

The same is true for Bahrain. After years of serious unrest in the 1990s, on taking power King Hamad introduced a series of reforms, held a constitutional referendum and transformed the state into a constitutional monarchy. Again, the regime quickly backtracked and has since proved unwilling to give up its control over the key instruments of state. If the brave actions of the pro-democracy forces are to be translated into real gains, then we need to be aware that the revolution has only just begun and that a long battle remains ahead. The temptation of the regimes will be to procrastinate and wait. The challenge of the pro-democracy protesters will be to sustain the momentum until all their demands have been met.

Libya: time for international intervention

From the shell of his former home, which was bombed by the Americans in 1986, a defiant Qaddafi dressed in full tribal attire gave what has to be one of the most bizarre speeches in the history of a dictator desperately clutching at power. The choice of setting along with Qaddafi's dress code were, of course, carefully chosen to project Qaddafi's image as that of a vanguard of Libya's independence while appealing to Libya's tribes for support.

Qaddafi's speech - typically rambling and long on rhetoric - was peppered with delusional allegations towards foreign powers, infantile language and overt threats towards those "cockroaches" and "rats" responsible for the uprising now taking place in Libya. According to Qaddafi's world, seditious forces had infiltrated Libya and drugged the youth, sending them out into the streets to cause chaos. By the time the dictator began reading from his Green Book most news channels had lost interest, along with just about everyone else. If anyone still harboured any doubts about Qaddafi's sanity, this speech proved once and for all that he is seriously ill.

But behind Qaddafi's madness and bizarre accusations, including attempts to portray what is happening as an imperialist plot on the part of Western powers to re-colonize Libya and grab its huge energy resources, lay a simple message: the Libyan dictator will do everything in his power to maintain his rule and crush the rebellion, "house by house".

Here, the international community needs to take the dictator at his word. Qaddafi has offered no concessions to the Libyan people apart from submission to his will. He has deducted from events in Tunisia and Egypt that to give any ground to the opposition will mark the beginning of the end of his 42-year rule. Credible reports have already emerged that Qaddafi has used live ammunition and military aircraft to indiscriminately attack demonstrators. In order to avoid what could turn into a Rwandan style bloodbath, the international community, including the US, EU, UN, NATO, and the Arab League (where he has few friends) must now act.

This statement by the International Crisis Group clearly spells out the actions that now need to be taken.

Libya: Protests gathering pace

Photo: Reuters

Although the situation in Libya remains confusing due to the lack of journalists and communications in the country, it does appear that momentum is building against the 42-year rule of Colonel Qaddafi. According to the latest reports, protesters have taken control of several major towns in the East of the country (and are now facilitating the entry of foreign journalists and NGOs). The protests have now spread throughout the country with the opposition planing to march on Tripoli, where demonstrations have already started.

As happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain, the initial use of violence in an attempt to stamp out the demonstrations has backfired and united the opposition against the regime. As the number of dead has increased so has the number of protesters on the streets. Meanwhile, Qaddafi's use of foreign mercenaries to brutally suppress the demonstrations has further fuelled anger and lead to greater resentment. Accordingly, this has resulted in defections among top officials and diplomats, as well as uniting some of the country's powerful tribes against Qaddafi. The 500,000-strong Tuareg tribe in south Libya has reportedly joined with the million-strong Warfala tribe in opposition to Qaddafi's rule. And it's numbers that matter here and could lead to the toppling of the dictator.

Whatever happens next it's likely to be bloody. There is no reason to expect Qaddafi to bow to very slowly growing international pressure to limit the use of deadly force. As outlined in the televised address by his son, Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi appears to believe that his country's vast oil wealth (and its subsequent investment potential; so far £43 billion making it a major shareholder in companies such as Italy's Fiat and Juventus Football Club, along with a huge property portfolio in London and elsewhere) leaves his regime immune from criticism.

Over the past few years Western companies have been queueing at the Colonel's door to gain contracts. Some of these contracts are now proving embarrassing, or rather awkward. For example, In May 2008, the US company General Dynamics secured a £102m contract to arm the Libyan army's 'elite' second brigade (run by Qaddafi's son Khamis), the very same force that has been using live ammunition against protesters in Benghazi, leading to scores of deaths. Britain has also been active in pushing arms Libya's way. British arms sales to Libya in the first nine months of 2010 reached over £200m.

Meanwhile, international oil companies have been lining up for lucrative contracts. Shell signed a deal with the Libyan government in 2005 to explore and develop five areas in the Sirte basin and was also awarded a gas exploration permit in 2007. BP, meanwhile, secured a $900 million deal in 2007, which the company said at the time was its largest single exploration commitment. ExxonMobil in February 2008 agreed to invest $97 million plus tens of millions in fees in offshore hydrocarbon exploration while a host of other global firms have also been awarded contracts.

The international diplomatic and business courting of the Libyan regime - beginning with Blair seven years ago and a hand shake in a tent - has left Qaddafi feeling emboldened and judging by his ego, probably invincible. However, this time he may have just miscalculated the situation and pushed his luck too far.

Bahrain: back to the bad old days

AP photo

The reaction of the Bahrain security forces to the pro-democracy protests - including the storming and killing of demonstrators at the protest camp at Pearl Roundabout - has finally exposed the brutality of the al-Khalifah regime and exposed the myth of the country's so-called reform process.

On taking power in 1999, king Hamad introduced a series of reforms aimed at building national unity after years of violence had scarred the kingdom during the long rule of his father, Sheikh Isa. The initial measures, such as the release of political prisoners, the right of return for exiled opposition leaders and the abolishment of the kingdom’s state security courts, succeeded in quelling the Shia unrest and ushered in a period of relative calm.

However, the new constitution issued in 2002 quickly put and end to aspirations for a new era of political openness. The new constitution gave the elected lower house fewer legislative powers than what it had enjoyed under the old constitution, while at the same time created an appointed upper house with greater powers. Nevertheless, the kingdom’s largest opposition group, al-Wefaq, entered the political process but has achieved precious little since, resulting in an increase in tensions and a revert to the more repressive system of governance characteristic of the late Sheikh Isa period.

As such, tensions have been rising between the regime and opposition activists in Shia populated areas in recent years, triggering a cycle of arrests and further demonstrations as the government has resorted to force to break up the protests. The violence witnessed over the past few days therefore is nothing new, though the repression of the regime has intensified. The unrest is being fuelled by the same issues affecting other MENA states, including lack of job opportunities, growing economic disparities, cosmetic reforms, corruption, and in the case of Bahrain, a strong sectarian dimension between the predominantly ruling Sunni elite and Bahrain’s poorer Shia majority.

Resentment is also high over the ruling family’s ongoing policy of trying to reduce the kingdom’s two-thirds majority Shia population by granting citizenship and jobs to Sunni Muslim Arabs and South Asian migrants that are denied to Shia Bahrainis, most notably in the security forces - the very same security forces that are now brutally attacking the native citizens of the country.

The Sunni elite has long sought to portray the Shia majority as a fifth column working for Iran. This is a baseless allegation but one that holds some sway in the US, particularly in the current geo-political climate and Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions. Bahrain is, of course, also home to the US Navy's Central Command and Fifth Fleet.

In sum, Bahrain’s political reforms - like most so-called reforms in the region - have so far taken place without requiring the ruling establishment to give up any of its privileges and its control over economic resources, state institutions, the army and the security services. Any meaningful opening up of the political system has ran up against fierce resistance from hardliners, led by the much despised prime minister, Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in power since 1971 and along with his cronies stands to lose long-standing economic and social privileges.

Last night's attack on the pro-democracy camp proves that such intransigent forces within the regime are in no mood to compromise and have learned nothing from the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt. Of all the MENA states now experiencing unrest - Bahrain's (along with Yemen) may turn out to be the bloodiest. Given the US military presence in the country, the US will need to respond quickly and clearly lay down the red lines to avoid a further escalation of violence.

p.s. And let's not forget which country has been arming Bahrain's police force: Britain

Egypt: the challenges ahead

Now that Mubarak has gone the difficult work in Egypt begins: the transition to a genuine democracy and the task of wrenching the reins of power out of the miltary's hands and into civilian control. This will be no easy task.

For the past 60 years the military has had a vested interest in the political and economic power structure preserved by successive Presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak - all military men. As Mohammad Ayoob puts it in Foreign Policy: " To expect the military to relinquish its corporate interests for the sake of popular welfare is likely to turn out to be delusion".

With the personalisation of the protests geared towards toppling Mubarak , what is striking now is how little has really changed. The 'Mubarak regime' is still very much in power and the country remains in the hands of the former President's top generals. One old general has been replaced by another old general, with even more power and less accountability than Mubarak had.

This is not to detract from the gains of the protest movement and the huge - if currently symbolic - achievements in ousting an Arab dictator and crossing the fear barrier. The Egyptian people have every right to celebrate what is still a remarkable achievement and for which many paid the highest price. But in practical terms nothing has actually changed yet. It is quite difficult to envisage a 'real revolution' that leaves the former power structures not only in place (and expects them to drive change), but also in a more commanding position than before.

Of course, it is very early days and we shall have to wait and see how much power the military is willing to concede. However, it is worrying to see (so far at least) that Mubarak's final cabinet remains in place. It is also not clear what role the despised and now throroughly discredited Omar Suleiman will play in the 'new Egypt'. Furthermore, that hated state of emergency law remains firmly in place.

There are other alarm bells. The military has issued orders outlawing labour strikes, and now it has achieved its aim of retaining power, it has appeared increasingly willing to resort to force to put an end to the demonstrations, which are now slated to take place every Friday until all the pro-democracy movement's demands are fully met, including: the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, a civilian transitional council, a new Constitution, the legalisation of all political parties and labour unions, and the prosecution of security forces implicated in murder and torture and the trial of Mubarak, among others.

It is difficult to see how the military will be able to meet all of these demands and respond the heightened aspirations of the Egyptians people without either resorting to repression to maintain order or undermining the very military power structure on which the Egyptian state is based, along with the vast corporate interests and informal power networks. In short, the Egyptian revolution has only just begun.

Egypt: Mubarak's last hours

Interesting reports have now emerged concerning Husni Mubarak's last hours in power, and his desperate attempts to hold on to the Presidency. A detailed account published in al-Ahram relates how the military expected Mubarak to announce his resignation on Thursday, along with the Americans and just about everyone else. However, according to the report, his son Gamal - who was being groomed to succeed his father - along with some of his top aides (and most probably the Saudis) were advising the beleaguered President that he could still ride out the turmoil and hang on to power.

Insiders gave the Associated Press a glimpse into the final hours before Mubarak fell. Their accounts paint a picture of an isolated dictator, unable or unwilling, to grasp the reality that nothing short of his immediate departure could save the country from descending into chaos. According to the AP:

"He did not look beyond what Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said the official. "Every incremental move (by Mubarak) was too little too late." The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice president, to end the protests."

According to the account in al-Ahram, "military leaders threatened to publish their own statement announcing that Mubarak had been sacked. The newspaper said a statement announcing Mubarak's resignation was pre-recorded by the army's chief-of-staff, Sami Enan, and delivered to the offices of the state television broadcaster Nile TV."
In the end, however, the military's statement was not required after Vice President Omar Suleiman agreed at the last minute to read his own 49 second statement that finally brought to an end Mubarak's 30-year rule.

Egypt: Just a short hop to Jeddah

It's getting really difficult to analyze the situation in Egypt amidst increasingly conflicting reports regarding the role of the army in all of this. I for one, always had my suspicions about the double handed game the army has been playing since the protests began. It failed, after all, to defend the protesters when they came under a brutal attack from Mubarak's paid thugs and by most eyewitness accounts, actually facilitated the entry of the NDP goons into Tahrir Square. The regime was no doubt hoping then that the resort to violence would have been enough to end the demonstrations.

Now it appears, though the situation is extremely uncertain, that the army - or at least the high command - is supporting Mubarak's desire to see out his presidential term and preside over the transition period. This may yet change again. There are reports now that Mubarak has fled to Sharm el-Sheikh - no doubt to consult with the two Abdullahs (Jordan and Saudi), both of whom have been urging Mubarak to hold onto power. Most likely, Mubarak's top generals (Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sami Einan) , also thought it would be a good idea for the President to take a break in an attempt to relieve tensions. The problem is, the protesters will only be happy when he makes the trip across the Red Sea to Jeddah.

Right now, I don't believe any analyst can predict the outcome. The scenarios are far too numerous and range from the sudden departure of the President and possibly Suleiman, to the complete fracture of the army between the old (Mubarak's men) and new guard. Leaked cables reveal US concerns about the army. Sensing that the tide is firmly against the old guard, will the younger generation of officers make a move? The only certainty is that the military will eventually decide the final outcome, the problem being that it itself appears to be in disarray.

Enter the Americans. The Obama administration's role has also been ambiguous. It began with Clinton's now infamous remark that the regime was "stable" (well technically she was right, just a pity it's loathed by the people). From the start the US regarded what was taking place as a huge geo-strategic headache, and hoped it would blow over quickly. When the administration realised that Mubarak was finished it quickly swung its weight behind Suleiman, no doubt with the backing of the Israelis, regardless of the fact that Suleiman is possibly more despised than Mubarak himself. Since then, the US has become increasingly vocal in calling for change, though notably has refrained from calling for Mubarak to go. The US admittedly has many strategic concerns, and is possibly also worried about what may be revealed when the regime collapses.

Interestingly, America's $1.3 billion in military aid appears to have given the US less leverage than one would imagine. I'm sure the US has had an impact on curtailing the regime's use of violence, but little else it seems. This may be partly due to the fact that if the US where to withdraw its aid package, it would have even less influence over events in the region. However, it is also clear that Mubarak's main backer - Saudi Arabia - is doing all it can to prop the ailing dictator up. King Abdullah has reportedly told the Americans that Mubarak must be allowed to complete his term and leave with dignity. The Saudi King has also pledged to step in with funding to cover any cut in aid from the US. No doubt, one of the reasons the regime feels it can withstand the huge economic losses right now is that it has secured Saudi backing.

Or maybe, it is just taking Mubarak and his cronies all this time to sort out their assets before the Swiss decide to freeze them?

Jordan: bending over backwards

The Jordanian regime is worried, overly so in my opinion. Since the protest began in Tunisia the Hashemites have been quick off the mark to coopt opposition forces (possibly with some US pressure to contain the unrest sweeping the region).

Firstly, the regime announced that it would subsidise basic food and energy. Secondly, it announced a public sector wage increase of $20 per month. Thirdly, King Abdullah sacked the government; and fourthly we are now hearing that the new PM, Marouf Bakhit, has been in negotiation with the Islamic Action Front and has offered the Islamist movement several positions in the new cabinet. The Islamist, feeling in a rather strong position right now despite having no representation in parliament, rather cleverly refused the offer, saying that ' they would rather be part of the process in an elected government'.

A delegation from the Muslim Brotherhood met with Bakhit on Sunday and according to a statement on the Islamist organisation's website presented the PM with a list of 14 demands, including: a new elections law, amending the Public Gatherings Law, the establishment of a teachers association, more public freedoms, and dissolving the current Parliament and electing a new Lower House under the new law.

Bakhit is still in the process of forming his new Cabinet, the composition of which should give some clues as to how serious the regime is concerning reform.

Egypt: procrastinate and wait

The process of change - or rather non-change - is beginning to take shape in Egypt. Backed by Washington and the EU (along with Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), Omar Suleiman has emerged as the preferred strongman to oversee the so-called 'transition to democracy'. Just one problem: he is neither trusted by the people nor the opposition groups. The key slogan of this peaceful revolution has been: 'al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam' (The people want an end to this regime). No one is more symbolic of this regime after Mubarak than Suleiman.

Without seeking to be too pessimistic, Washington's decision to back Suleiman would appear to suggest that those who have argued throughout these events that US strategic interests must come first have triumphed over pro-democracy voices. Since this uprising began the US administration has been deeply divided on how to respond, which explains Washington's constantly shifting positions over the past two weeks. Interestingly, events in Egypt have also revealed divisions within the traditionally pro-Israel neoconservative supporters of the Bush era, with hawks such as Elliott Abrams and Robert Kagan arguing that Mubarak should go.

However, the momentum now appears to be with the 'better the devil you know' advocates. This is hardly surprising given that caution has been the watchword during the Obama presidency. And in this context, Omar Suleiman is the obvious candidate. With a military career spanning almost six decades, Suleiman enjoys the support of the army and security forces and forms a link between Egypt's military and political elites. Furthermore, as Mubarak's trusted ally and confidant, he also shares the president's views on the key regional issues, from Israel to Iran, and is therefore crucial to maintaining Washington's strategic interests in the region. He has also served the US in its 'war on terror' and the controversial CIA renditions programme.

According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, his 18 career as Intelligence Chief has been marked by 'widespread abuses and torture' and has played a commanding role in suppressing political dissent and free speech. Indeed, Suleiman was considered Egypt's 'torture-in-chief' for terror suspects and is widely known to hold strong anti-Islamist sentiments. Recent and timely cables released by Wikileaks also reveal Suleiman's long history of citing the Islamist threat to justify years of authoritarian rule. He is also an integral part of Egypt's vast patronage (Mubarak has an estimated fortune of $80 billion) network that has - like similar Arab regimes - regarded Egypt as a private ATM to be plundered at will.

The tactic of the regime now - with perceived US backing - appears to be: procrastinate and wait. After exhausting all other strategies, (repression, media control, fermenting chaos through hired thugs, pretending the military is on the side of the people etc ... ), the regime is now holding out the carrot of reforms in the hope of dividing the 'official opposition' and isolating the 'real opposition' (those in Tahrir Square). A the same time it continues to detain activists. If the regime can succeed in making deals with Egypt's weak opposition parties, though this is not guaranteed, it hopes the protesters will eventually be forced to pack up their tents and go home (and wait for the dreaded knock on the door from Suleiman's security thugs).

The opposition's lack of unity is its Achilles Heel. The various parties and non-parties need to quickly agree on a set of demands and stick to them until the regime yields. The mass protests over the past two weeks and the losses suffered at the hands of the Mubarak-Suleiman security goons now need to be protected if Egypt is to move forward. The protesters after all have the greatest weapon: the demographic factor, a youthful population that has the stamina to keep the protests alive.

On a side note, nervous Arab regimes have been adopting and array of tactics to contain the possibility of the unrest spreading, with the European Union funded Palestinian security forces clamping down in the Occupied West Bank.

Egypt: the Pharaoh sends in the cavalry

Mubarak is nothing if not a survivor, and yesterday proved he has no intention of pushing Egypt towards a more democratic future. What transpired was a clever, if rather crudely, orchestrated plan by the regime to take back control. The first sign that things were about to go badly came when the Internet returned, then came the pro-Mubarak supporters, strategically placed in front of Western media offices to gain maximum coverage; and later the attack on the pro-democracy protesters by paid thugs armed with sticks, knives and other weapons.

To an extent the regime’s tactics have worked. Several Western media broadcasts began framing what was taking place as a genuine reaction to the growing instability by pro-Mubarak supporters desperate to get back to work to feed their families. It was, of course, nothing of the sort, but rather a tried and tested strategy by the Mubarak regime to orchestrate its forces, including remnants of the police state that had melted away last week after Mubarak called in the Army, against pro-democracy supporters. Photos of the IDs of security officials captured by pro-democracy protesters have been published on Flickr.

Where to from here? What is clear so far is that the protesters have not made any significant dent in the military’s chain of command. Furthermore, although the regime is attempting to portray the army as neutral, yesterday the army appeared to be playing a double game of non-intervention while at the same time facilitating the entry of the pro-Mubarak thugs into Tahrir Square. I would like to be proved wrong, but US procrastination over the past ten days also appears to have been largely aimed at preserving the status-quo, with or without Mubarak. Hilary Clinton is already addressing General Omar Suleiman is if he were the new leader. Once again, the US appears to have chosen stability over democracy, but will achieve neither.

If the Obama administration continues to pursue this course, it will have missed a great and historic opportunity to steer the region to a more positive future. And if the outcome of this genuine popular uprising ends in a new military regime headed by General Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian state will become more repressive and illegitimate than ever. In this environment radical Islamism will grow, and the emergence of non-state armed groups challenging the status quo will increase, not just in Egypt, but across the entire region.

Robert Springborg has a well argued and rather pessimistic assessment of the situation in Egypt on FP’s Middle East Chanel in which he takes this argument further. He contends that the chance for democratic transition has already passed and Mubarak’s backers in the military will remain firmly in control, backed by the Obama administration. I really hope he is wrong, but my head is beginning to tell me he may be right.

Mubarak drags Egypt into the abyss

After warning in his speech last night that the opposition is attempting to drag the country into violence and anarchy, Mubarak has set out today to do just that. After a week of peaceful protests and the blossoming of civil society – with anti-government protesters taking responsibility for civic duties such as cleaning the streets - it appears by all independent accounts that Mubarak has decided to send his National Democratic Party thugs into Tahrir Square in an attempt to break up the demonstrations and prove that only he has the power to bring order, or disorder.

According to most independent eye-witness reports, the pro-Mubarak supporters were bussed into Cairo and came prepared for violence, carrying clubs, knives and other small weapons, indicating that the violence was clearly orchestrated in an attempt to stamp out the protests. Journalists and others have also recognised some of the pro-Mubarak supporters as plain clothed policemen. It is uncertain what role the military has played here, but it has so far not intervened. This appears to indicate that the generals are happy to let this situation continue and there have been some accusations that the military actually facilitated the entry of the pro-Mubarak forces into the square.

This appears to be a final throw of the dice by Mubarak to create as much disorder as possible and sow fear among the Egyptian population in a desperate attempt to hold on to power. It is unlikely to work. International condemnation at the turn of events is beginning to build momentum. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and others have condemned the use of violence against peaceful protesters. Yet the US State Department is still calling on all sides “to show restraint and avoid violence”, adding that “Egypt's path to democratic change must be peaceful.” But it was peaceful until Mubarak’s thugs attacked the protesters. What has to happen before the US finally reins in Mubarak and calls for him to go?

Egypt: Mubarak is going .... but when?

President Husni Mubarak is nothing if not defiant. Last night he yet again portrayed himself as the father of the nation and the bulwark against chaos and disorder. The speech was a last ditch attempt by the dictator to sow fear among the general population and take the sting out of the opposition, which he accused of fermenting anarchy and of engaging in looting and violence. According to the patriarch Mubarak, only he has the ability to steer Egypt through this time of crisis.

Apart from the blatant untruths in the speech - it has been Mubarak's own security forces that have been responsible for most of the violence - the patronising tone and Mubarak's defiance are likely to backfire and merely energise the opposition. Mubarak's decision not to stand for reelection will do nothing to reduce tensions, and will be viewed by many as a trick to cling on to power. Furthermore, it appears that even this announcement came as a result of considerable behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure from the United States, rather than from a genuine understanding of the situation by Mubarak or a commitment to real change.

It is difficult to see how Mubarak can stay in power for eight months. As the former neo-conservative Bush official, Elliot Abrams, put it: "If he'd made this announcement a week ago, much less a month or two months ago, this whole crisis would never have happened. But to do it now, I think he's got to step down." And this view appears to be gaining traction with the Obama administration, which has once again been playing catch-up and changing its tone in response to fast moving developments. Last night Obama said that change should begin "now". However, it is far from certain what the US President means by this. Does he mean that Mubarak should step aside immediately? or that he should begin implementing constitutional reforms without delay? I get the impression the US was hoping that the latter would be enough but this is now looking very unlikely.

The US administration's primary main concern here is, of course, regional stability, intelligence gathering, protecting the flow of goods through Suez and securing the Egyptian border with Israel (Gaza) against arms trafficking etc ... But propping up Mubarak for another eight months is not going to create stability. Already, we are witnessing clashes between pro-Mubarak supporters and opposition demonstrators. The demonstrations themselves are likely to escalate further as Mubarak attempts to stay put, with a planned march on the presidential palace planned for Friday.

If this march goes ahead - or is prevented by the army or the Republican Guard, the situation could quickly spiral out of control into violence and chaos. Also, the longer the demonstrations drag on, the more chance there is that they will spread to other regional states (which they already have). Mubarak and those around him may also revert to sabotage tactics by using the security services and party apparatchiks to cause chaos. There are reports this is already taking place.

What is baffling here is that the US State Department does not appear to have had a contingency plan for a this type of scenario, despite the fact that they have had thirty years to draw one up. And despite the fact that the ailing president - who was due for reelection in September- is 82 years old and up until last week had not designated a successor. At present the State Department is still deliberating what to do about the situation. Let's hope they come up with some answers soon.