According to the Oxford dictionary definition, a revolution is the "forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system". Given this definition, can we really refer to the mass uprisings in the Arab world as revolutions? Libya may yet prove to be the exception here but I think we need to be very careful before defining the Tunisian and Egyptian models as revolutions yet. Revolutions in progress may be a more accurate description. By defining them as revolutions there is an obvious danger of lending credence to these regimes that real change in the power structures of these states has already taken place when in reality not that much has changed beyond some recycling of old faces, particularly in Egypt where the Mubarak cabinet (bar a few exceptions) along with the emergency laws etc ... remain firmly in place.
Of course, it's early days and the speed with which events have been unfolding makes it difficult to keep up. But despite the remarkable achievements and courage of the Arab publics it remains a fact that the key slogan of the uprisings - al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam (the people demand the fall of the regime) is a long way from being achieved in any of the states (though again, Libya may prove the exception). The key challenge for the protest movements now is to maintain and sustain the momentum whilst working to institutionalise their gains and transform them into a system of pluralistic and democratic politics. This will prove a difficult task given the weak and fragmented nature of the various opposition parties which are pitted against the wily, organised regimes that remain firmly entrenched and as such have a significant advantage in shaping the future 'reform process'.
Of course, it's early days and the speed with which events have been unfolding makes it difficult to keep up. But despite the remarkable achievements and courage of the Arab publics it remains a fact that the key slogan of the uprisings - al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam (the people demand the fall of the regime) is a long way from being achieved in any of the states (though again, Libya may prove the exception). The key challenge for the protest movements now is to maintain and sustain the momentum whilst working to institutionalise their gains and transform them into a system of pluralistic and democratic politics. This will prove a difficult task given the weak and fragmented nature of the various opposition parties which are pitted against the wily, organised regimes that remain firmly entrenched and as such have a significant advantage in shaping the future 'reform process'.
In Egypt in particular, the military - which has effectively been in power since 1952 - is at present in a strong position to shape the outcome. And so far, there have been precious few signs that it is committed to real reform with a real absence of confidence building measures. Such measures could include an immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the freeing of political prisoners and respecting freedom of assembly and the rights of independent trade unions. The lack of progress is hardly surprising. The military has so far played an ambivalent role and its primary goal has been retaining stability while preserving its political influence and business interests. After all, this is the very reason it eventually and reluctantly decided that Mubarak should go.
Some clues to how far the military is committed to real reform will soon be revealed and will include: the level of input from opposition parties into the new constitution and the parameters of the new electoral law. The timescale for reforms will also prove telling. If the military seeks to rush through these changes the likelihood is that it's main aim is to generally preserve the status quo, while introducing slightly more opposition voices into the new parliament, particularly ones that are susceptible to cooption.
Past examples of reforms in the Arab world do not bode well. In 1989 Algeria experienced widespread civil unrest that forced the regime into constitutional reforms and allowed greater freedoms. However, when the elections of 1992 resulted in a landslide for the Islamist opposition the government quickly backtracked and cancelled the result. The result was a bloody civil war and one that Algerians will not want to repeat. Also in 1989, Jordan ended 23-years of martial law in response to growing instability in the regime's tribal heartlands, restored parliamentary democracy and extended freedom of assembly and expression. However, after appeasing the protesters the Hashemite monarchy quickly backtracked and introduced a raft of temporary laws to undermine the brief democratic gains.
The same is true for Bahrain. After years of serious unrest in the 1990s, on taking power King Hamad introduced a series of reforms, held a constitutional referendum and transformed the state into a constitutional monarchy. Again, the regime quickly backtracked and has since proved unwilling to give up its control over the key instruments of state. If the brave actions of the pro-democracy forces are to be translated into real gains, then we need to be aware that the revolution has only just begun and that a long battle remains ahead. The temptation of the regimes will be to procrastinate and wait. The challenge of the pro-democracy protesters will be to sustain the momentum until all their demands have been met.
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