The ripple first tangible ripple effect of the so-called Arab spring on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict revealed itself on Wednesday with the signing of a Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity accord.
After four years of hostility following Hamas' 2006 election victory, the two key Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas have agreed to set up a unified caretaker government which will pave the way for new elections. So after years of animosity and repeated failed attempts to reach a compromise, why now?
Firstly, Egypt's secret role in brokering the agreement appears to be the first clear sign that the country's de facto new ruler and long-time defence chief, Mohammad Tantawi, is far less rigid towards the Islamist movement than his former boss Husni Mubarak. This new position is being driven by pragmatism rather than any love for the Brotherhood and reflects the changed political landscape in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak, which has left the remnant of Mubarak's NDP party and the Islamists in the driving seat - for now.
If and when civilian rule is restored, the military, which controls a big slice of the economy, will want to preserve its privileges and may seek a background role as 'national guardian'. It remains unclear what role the Islamist will play in the future political system. This will depend on how well the Brotherhood performs in the September election. If the group performs well, it will feel emboldened and no doubt seek greater power. In the meantime, all sides will be hedging their bets and the country's military rulers will be looking to build support among the Islamists. The signing of the recent Hamas-PA accord will therefore boost the military's political capital in an uncertain landscape.
Secondly, although the new nuanced regional approach of Egypt towards Hamas and Iran, compared to Mubarak's staunch alliance with the US and Israel, is certainly a factor in bridging the divide between the PA and Hamas, there is also a strong dose of realism on the part of both Palestinian factions. Both must be aware that the so-called Arab Spring may be heading their way and that a failure to move forward may result in a backlash from a Palestinian public fed up with poor governance, bickering and infighting.
For Hamas, the threats on the horizon appear more obvious. After four years in charge of Gaza they have failed to deliver any tangible economic benefits and have ruled over a population largely cut off from the outside world, in main as a result of Israel's cruel blockade. Nevertheless, Gaza's population will not indefinitely put up with the status-quo. Furthermore, the largely secular-driven Arab uprisings - though Islamist parties may emerge as future benefactors -have largely undermined Hamas' message and portrayed the group as belonging to the past rather than the future. This image will only be reinforced by Hamas' alliance with Iran and Syria. Both states have resorted to severe repression in order to quell their own opposition movements and images of largely Sunni Muslim Syrian protesters being shot in the streets by an Allawi-dominated military will not resonate well with the overwhelmingly Sunni Palestinian popualtion.
For the PA, the accord with Hamas appears to be aimed at shoring up its flagging popularity, pleasing the new regime in Egypt, and an attempt to offset challenges to its authority stemming from the Arab spring. More crucially, however, it represents a conviction that any negotiations with Israel so long as Netanyahu is in power are a non-starter. It also signifies the PA's lack of faith in the Obama administration's ability to have any influence over the current Israeli government and the death of the so-called peace process itself.
All eyes will now be on the reaction of the US and the Quartet. Will it once again demand that the new government must recognize Israel and honour the agreements already signed with it? If the quartet sticks to its previous position that Hamas must recognise Israel's right to exist and reject armed struggle then all sides will be back to square one. Mind you, they never got to stage two anyway.
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