Egypt: the challenges ahead

Now that Mubarak has gone the difficult work in Egypt begins: the transition to a genuine democracy and the task of wrenching the reins of power out of the miltary's hands and into civilian control. This will be no easy task.

For the past 60 years the military has had a vested interest in the political and economic power structure preserved by successive Presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak - all military men. As Mohammad Ayoob puts it in Foreign Policy: " To expect the military to relinquish its corporate interests for the sake of popular welfare is likely to turn out to be delusion".

With the personalisation of the protests geared towards toppling Mubarak , what is striking now is how little has really changed. The 'Mubarak regime' is still very much in power and the country remains in the hands of the former President's top generals. One old general has been replaced by another old general, with even more power and less accountability than Mubarak had.

This is not to detract from the gains of the protest movement and the huge - if currently symbolic - achievements in ousting an Arab dictator and crossing the fear barrier. The Egyptian people have every right to celebrate what is still a remarkable achievement and for which many paid the highest price. But in practical terms nothing has actually changed yet. It is quite difficult to envisage a 'real revolution' that leaves the former power structures not only in place (and expects them to drive change), but also in a more commanding position than before.

Of course, it is very early days and we shall have to wait and see how much power the military is willing to concede. However, it is worrying to see (so far at least) that Mubarak's final cabinet remains in place. It is also not clear what role the despised and now throroughly discredited Omar Suleiman will play in the 'new Egypt'. Furthermore, that hated state of emergency law remains firmly in place.

There are other alarm bells. The military has issued orders outlawing labour strikes, and now it has achieved its aim of retaining power, it has appeared increasingly willing to resort to force to put an end to the demonstrations, which are now slated to take place every Friday until all the pro-democracy movement's demands are fully met, including: the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, a civilian transitional council, a new Constitution, the legalisation of all political parties and labour unions, and the prosecution of security forces implicated in murder and torture and the trial of Mubarak, among others.

It is difficult to see how the military will be able to meet all of these demands and respond the heightened aspirations of the Egyptians people without either resorting to repression to maintain order or undermining the very military power structure on which the Egyptian state is based, along with the vast corporate interests and informal power networks. In short, the Egyptian revolution has only just begun.