Egyptian revolutionary humour

And this one reads: Go [Mubarak] my hand is hurting me".

Revolution or strategic maneuvering?

According to the Oxford dictionary definition, a revolution is the "forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system". Given this definition, can we really refer to the mass uprisings in the Arab world as revolutions? Libya may yet prove to be the exception here but I think we need to be very careful before defining the Tunisian and Egyptian models as revolutions yet. Revolutions in progress may be a more accurate description. By defining them as revolutions there is an obvious danger of lending credence to these regimes that real change in the power structures of these states has already taken place when in reality not that much has changed beyond some recycling of old faces, particularly in Egypt where the Mubarak cabinet (bar a few exceptions) along with the emergency laws etc ... remain firmly in place.

Of course, it's early days and the speed with which events have been unfolding makes it difficult to keep up. But despite the remarkable achievements and courage of the Arab publics it remains a fact that the key slogan of the uprisings - al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam (the people demand the fall of the regime) is a long way from being achieved in any of the states (though again, Libya may prove the exception). The key challenge for the protest movements now is to maintain and sustain the momentum whilst working to institutionalise their gains and transform them into a system of pluralistic and democratic politics. This will prove a difficult task given the weak and fragmented nature of the various opposition parties which are pitted against the wily, organised regimes that remain firmly entrenched and as such have a significant advantage in shaping the future 'reform process'.

In Egypt in particular, the military - which has effectively been in power since 1952 - is at present in a strong position to shape the outcome. And so far, there have been precious few signs that it is committed to real reform with a real absence of confidence building measures. Such measures could include an immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the freeing of political prisoners and respecting freedom of assembly and the rights of independent trade unions. The lack of progress is hardly surprising. The military has so far played an ambivalent role and its primary goal has been retaining stability while preserving its political influence and business interests. After all, this is the very reason it eventually and reluctantly decided that Mubarak should go.

Some clues to how far the military is committed to real reform will soon be revealed and will include: the level of input from opposition parties into the new constitution and the parameters of the new electoral law. The timescale for reforms will also prove telling. If the military seeks to rush through these changes the likelihood is that it's main aim is to generally preserve the status quo, while introducing slightly more opposition voices into the new parliament, particularly ones that are susceptible to cooption.

Past examples of reforms in the Arab world do not bode well. In 1989 Algeria experienced widespread civil unrest that forced the regime into constitutional reforms and allowed greater freedoms. However, when the elections of 1992 resulted in a landslide for the Islamist opposition the government quickly backtracked and cancelled the result. The result was a bloody civil war and one that Algerians will not want to repeat. Also in 1989, Jordan ended 23-years of martial law in response to growing instability in the regime's tribal heartlands, restored parliamentary democracy and extended freedom of assembly and expression. However, after appeasing the protesters the Hashemite monarchy quickly backtracked and introduced a raft of temporary laws to undermine the brief democratic gains.

The same is true for Bahrain. After years of serious unrest in the 1990s, on taking power King Hamad introduced a series of reforms, held a constitutional referendum and transformed the state into a constitutional monarchy. Again, the regime quickly backtracked and has since proved unwilling to give up its control over the key instruments of state. If the brave actions of the pro-democracy forces are to be translated into real gains, then we need to be aware that the revolution has only just begun and that a long battle remains ahead. The temptation of the regimes will be to procrastinate and wait. The challenge of the pro-democracy protesters will be to sustain the momentum until all their demands have been met.

Libya: time for international intervention

From the shell of his former home, which was bombed by the Americans in 1986, a defiant Qaddafi dressed in full tribal attire gave what has to be one of the most bizarre speeches in the history of a dictator desperately clutching at power. The choice of setting along with Qaddafi's dress code were, of course, carefully chosen to project Qaddafi's image as that of a vanguard of Libya's independence while appealing to Libya's tribes for support.

Qaddafi's speech - typically rambling and long on rhetoric - was peppered with delusional allegations towards foreign powers, infantile language and overt threats towards those "cockroaches" and "rats" responsible for the uprising now taking place in Libya. According to Qaddafi's world, seditious forces had infiltrated Libya and drugged the youth, sending them out into the streets to cause chaos. By the time the dictator began reading from his Green Book most news channels had lost interest, along with just about everyone else. If anyone still harboured any doubts about Qaddafi's sanity, this speech proved once and for all that he is seriously ill.

But behind Qaddafi's madness and bizarre accusations, including attempts to portray what is happening as an imperialist plot on the part of Western powers to re-colonize Libya and grab its huge energy resources, lay a simple message: the Libyan dictator will do everything in his power to maintain his rule and crush the rebellion, "house by house".

Here, the international community needs to take the dictator at his word. Qaddafi has offered no concessions to the Libyan people apart from submission to his will. He has deducted from events in Tunisia and Egypt that to give any ground to the opposition will mark the beginning of the end of his 42-year rule. Credible reports have already emerged that Qaddafi has used live ammunition and military aircraft to indiscriminately attack demonstrators. In order to avoid what could turn into a Rwandan style bloodbath, the international community, including the US, EU, UN, NATO, and the Arab League (where he has few friends) must now act.

This statement by the International Crisis Group clearly spells out the actions that now need to be taken.

Libya: Protests gathering pace

Photo: Reuters

Although the situation in Libya remains confusing due to the lack of journalists and communications in the country, it does appear that momentum is building against the 42-year rule of Colonel Qaddafi. According to the latest reports, protesters have taken control of several major towns in the East of the country (and are now facilitating the entry of foreign journalists and NGOs). The protests have now spread throughout the country with the opposition planing to march on Tripoli, where demonstrations have already started.

As happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain, the initial use of violence in an attempt to stamp out the demonstrations has backfired and united the opposition against the regime. As the number of dead has increased so has the number of protesters on the streets. Meanwhile, Qaddafi's use of foreign mercenaries to brutally suppress the demonstrations has further fuelled anger and lead to greater resentment. Accordingly, this has resulted in defections among top officials and diplomats, as well as uniting some of the country's powerful tribes against Qaddafi. The 500,000-strong Tuareg tribe in south Libya has reportedly joined with the million-strong Warfala tribe in opposition to Qaddafi's rule. And it's numbers that matter here and could lead to the toppling of the dictator.

Whatever happens next it's likely to be bloody. There is no reason to expect Qaddafi to bow to very slowly growing international pressure to limit the use of deadly force. As outlined in the televised address by his son, Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi appears to believe that his country's vast oil wealth (and its subsequent investment potential; so far £43 billion making it a major shareholder in companies such as Italy's Fiat and Juventus Football Club, along with a huge property portfolio in London and elsewhere) leaves his regime immune from criticism.

Over the past few years Western companies have been queueing at the Colonel's door to gain contracts. Some of these contracts are now proving embarrassing, or rather awkward. For example, In May 2008, the US company General Dynamics secured a £102m contract to arm the Libyan army's 'elite' second brigade (run by Qaddafi's son Khamis), the very same force that has been using live ammunition against protesters in Benghazi, leading to scores of deaths. Britain has also been active in pushing arms Libya's way. British arms sales to Libya in the first nine months of 2010 reached over £200m.

Meanwhile, international oil companies have been lining up for lucrative contracts. Shell signed a deal with the Libyan government in 2005 to explore and develop five areas in the Sirte basin and was also awarded a gas exploration permit in 2007. BP, meanwhile, secured a $900 million deal in 2007, which the company said at the time was its largest single exploration commitment. ExxonMobil in February 2008 agreed to invest $97 million plus tens of millions in fees in offshore hydrocarbon exploration while a host of other global firms have also been awarded contracts.

The international diplomatic and business courting of the Libyan regime - beginning with Blair seven years ago and a hand shake in a tent - has left Qaddafi feeling emboldened and judging by his ego, probably invincible. However, this time he may have just miscalculated the situation and pushed his luck too far.

Bahrain: back to the bad old days

AP photo

The reaction of the Bahrain security forces to the pro-democracy protests - including the storming and killing of demonstrators at the protest camp at Pearl Roundabout - has finally exposed the brutality of the al-Khalifah regime and exposed the myth of the country's so-called reform process.

On taking power in 1999, king Hamad introduced a series of reforms aimed at building national unity after years of violence had scarred the kingdom during the long rule of his father, Sheikh Isa. The initial measures, such as the release of political prisoners, the right of return for exiled opposition leaders and the abolishment of the kingdom’s state security courts, succeeded in quelling the Shia unrest and ushered in a period of relative calm.

However, the new constitution issued in 2002 quickly put and end to aspirations for a new era of political openness. The new constitution gave the elected lower house fewer legislative powers than what it had enjoyed under the old constitution, while at the same time created an appointed upper house with greater powers. Nevertheless, the kingdom’s largest opposition group, al-Wefaq, entered the political process but has achieved precious little since, resulting in an increase in tensions and a revert to the more repressive system of governance characteristic of the late Sheikh Isa period.

As such, tensions have been rising between the regime and opposition activists in Shia populated areas in recent years, triggering a cycle of arrests and further demonstrations as the government has resorted to force to break up the protests. The violence witnessed over the past few days therefore is nothing new, though the repression of the regime has intensified. The unrest is being fuelled by the same issues affecting other MENA states, including lack of job opportunities, growing economic disparities, cosmetic reforms, corruption, and in the case of Bahrain, a strong sectarian dimension between the predominantly ruling Sunni elite and Bahrain’s poorer Shia majority.

Resentment is also high over the ruling family’s ongoing policy of trying to reduce the kingdom’s two-thirds majority Shia population by granting citizenship and jobs to Sunni Muslim Arabs and South Asian migrants that are denied to Shia Bahrainis, most notably in the security forces - the very same security forces that are now brutally attacking the native citizens of the country.

The Sunni elite has long sought to portray the Shia majority as a fifth column working for Iran. This is a baseless allegation but one that holds some sway in the US, particularly in the current geo-political climate and Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions. Bahrain is, of course, also home to the US Navy's Central Command and Fifth Fleet.

In sum, Bahrain’s political reforms - like most so-called reforms in the region - have so far taken place without requiring the ruling establishment to give up any of its privileges and its control over economic resources, state institutions, the army and the security services. Any meaningful opening up of the political system has ran up against fierce resistance from hardliners, led by the much despised prime minister, Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in power since 1971 and along with his cronies stands to lose long-standing economic and social privileges.

Last night's attack on the pro-democracy camp proves that such intransigent forces within the regime are in no mood to compromise and have learned nothing from the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt. Of all the MENA states now experiencing unrest - Bahrain's (along with Yemen) may turn out to be the bloodiest. Given the US military presence in the country, the US will need to respond quickly and clearly lay down the red lines to avoid a further escalation of violence.

p.s. And let's not forget which country has been arming Bahrain's police force: Britain

Egypt: the challenges ahead

Now that Mubarak has gone the difficult work in Egypt begins: the transition to a genuine democracy and the task of wrenching the reins of power out of the miltary's hands and into civilian control. This will be no easy task.

For the past 60 years the military has had a vested interest in the political and economic power structure preserved by successive Presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak - all military men. As Mohammad Ayoob puts it in Foreign Policy: " To expect the military to relinquish its corporate interests for the sake of popular welfare is likely to turn out to be delusion".

With the personalisation of the protests geared towards toppling Mubarak , what is striking now is how little has really changed. The 'Mubarak regime' is still very much in power and the country remains in the hands of the former President's top generals. One old general has been replaced by another old general, with even more power and less accountability than Mubarak had.

This is not to detract from the gains of the protest movement and the huge - if currently symbolic - achievements in ousting an Arab dictator and crossing the fear barrier. The Egyptian people have every right to celebrate what is still a remarkable achievement and for which many paid the highest price. But in practical terms nothing has actually changed yet. It is quite difficult to envisage a 'real revolution' that leaves the former power structures not only in place (and expects them to drive change), but also in a more commanding position than before.

Of course, it is very early days and we shall have to wait and see how much power the military is willing to concede. However, it is worrying to see (so far at least) that Mubarak's final cabinet remains in place. It is also not clear what role the despised and now throroughly discredited Omar Suleiman will play in the 'new Egypt'. Furthermore, that hated state of emergency law remains firmly in place.

There are other alarm bells. The military has issued orders outlawing labour strikes, and now it has achieved its aim of retaining power, it has appeared increasingly willing to resort to force to put an end to the demonstrations, which are now slated to take place every Friday until all the pro-democracy movement's demands are fully met, including: the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, a civilian transitional council, a new Constitution, the legalisation of all political parties and labour unions, and the prosecution of security forces implicated in murder and torture and the trial of Mubarak, among others.

It is difficult to see how the military will be able to meet all of these demands and respond the heightened aspirations of the Egyptians people without either resorting to repression to maintain order or undermining the very military power structure on which the Egyptian state is based, along with the vast corporate interests and informal power networks. In short, the Egyptian revolution has only just begun.

Egypt: Mubarak's last hours

Interesting reports have now emerged concerning Husni Mubarak's last hours in power, and his desperate attempts to hold on to the Presidency. A detailed account published in al-Ahram relates how the military expected Mubarak to announce his resignation on Thursday, along with the Americans and just about everyone else. However, according to the report, his son Gamal - who was being groomed to succeed his father - along with some of his top aides (and most probably the Saudis) were advising the beleaguered President that he could still ride out the turmoil and hang on to power.

Insiders gave the Associated Press a glimpse into the final hours before Mubarak fell. Their accounts paint a picture of an isolated dictator, unable or unwilling, to grasp the reality that nothing short of his immediate departure could save the country from descending into chaos. According to the AP:

"He did not look beyond what Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said the official. "Every incremental move (by Mubarak) was too little too late." The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice president, to end the protests."

According to the account in al-Ahram, "military leaders threatened to publish their own statement announcing that Mubarak had been sacked. The newspaper said a statement announcing Mubarak's resignation was pre-recorded by the army's chief-of-staff, Sami Enan, and delivered to the offices of the state television broadcaster Nile TV."
In the end, however, the military's statement was not required after Vice President Omar Suleiman agreed at the last minute to read his own 49 second statement that finally brought to an end Mubarak's 30-year rule.