(AP Photo)
To many, UNSCR 1973 took a long time in coming. The immediate impetus, despite the various conspiracy theories now emerging about a Western plot to grab Libya's energy resources, was to safeguard the citizens of Benghazi from Qaddaffi's advancing army. The Libyan leader, buoyed by military successes in forcing the rebels out of Ajdabiyah and elsewhere, had just hours before the resolution was passed threatened to cleanse Benghazi and show "no mercy". For a leader with a track record of brutality, including the use of foreign mercenaries against his own people, these threats needed to be taken seriously and the international community was right to intervene.
But now the debate has quickly moved on. Apart from the inevitable criticism from the left, who have failed to put forward any credible alternatives to the UN mandated action, already we are beginning to see cracks emerge in the international community and the coalition itself. Yesterday, Russian PM Vladimir Putin compared the military action in Libya to the invasion of Iraq and likened it to the "Crusades", knowing full well the strong impact of this word in the Arab world. China has called for the air strikes to stop. Both Russia and China were among five states that abstained on UNSCR 1973 but nevertheless allowed it to pass. The Arab League, crucial to convincing the Obama administration to throw its support behind the UN resolution, has also wobbled, with its secretary general Amr Moussa voicing criticism before suddenly backtracking, no doubt under political pressure. And now we are hearing that NATO itself is unwilling to take over the operation, with Turkey calling for immediate talks.
There are, of course, good reasons why some of these political actors are wary of supporting the military intervention, even if they either initially signed up or acquiesced to the will of the international community. China, Russia and Turkey have their own restive minorities seeking greater political independence and freedom and however unlikely, would not want a precedence set for liberal interventionism. Likewise, the under pressure dictators of the Arab League are paradoxically attempting to demonstrate their support for their 'Libyan brothers' to appease their own populations in the grip of revolutionary fervour, whilst at the same time becoming increasingly wary of the aims of the coalition in pursuing actual regime change. However, what unites them all is the deep misgivings and an unwillingness to fully commit politically to a project whose aims are obscure and whose success is far from sure. What would have been an easier operation weeks ago has now become considerably more difficult.
As such, the longer the military campaign continues and the more the coalition inevitably gets drags into this conflict the more these cracks will deepen. It is clear that the goal of the US, Britain and France in particular is regime change. Europe does not want to be left with a pariah state on its southern borders ruled by a dictator with a track record in supporting terrorism. The US likewise does not want the headache of dealing with a rogue state that will inevitably seek to revive its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, backed by the country's energy reserves (and China and Russia securing lucrative contracts). Also, if Qaddafi succeeds in suppressing the rebellion there is the danger that other Arab states will follow suit, resulting in more regional instability and the prospect of multiple armed insurrections. On the other hand, if the US is seen to overtly side with the rebels militarily then other opposition movements in the Arab world and possibly the Gulf, will feel more emboldened to challenge their respective regimes. This dilemma - along with the uncertainly of what comes after Qaddafi - goes a long way to explaining the current hedging on the part of the coalition.
Since the adoption of UNSCR 1973 the coalition has set about degrading Qaddafi's military capabilities largely under the pretext of humanitarian intervention in the hope that this will be enough to fracture the military while at the same time tip the balance of power in favour of the rebels. It may yet work. So far, however, the signs are less than positive. This is not Afghanistan in 2001 where the US used the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban while providing overwhelming air power. At present, the rebels appear to lack the military organisation and means to take the fight to Qaddafi and a stalemate looks like a distinct possibility. The outcome could well be the partition of Libya and a prolonged conflict, as it seems unlikely that neither side would accept this scenario. Furthermore, would the coalition accept such an outcome? If not, are coalition warplanes going to bomb Qaddafi's forces to clear the route to Tripoli? Too many questions and so few answers. And this is before we even consider what comes next if Qaddafi does fall. Foreign Policy has some analysis here.
