America's Syria conundrum

Not much time for blogging at the moment so I'm going to hand over to long time Syria watcher Patrick Seal who has offered some excellent analysis in Foreign Policy in regards of the dilemma posed by events in Syria to the US and Israel. Personally, I think both states would prefer the status quo - better the devil you know - regardless of the fact that Syria lies at the heart of the so-called Iran axis.

Jordan's Tahrir Square moment

I'm going to leave it Naseem Tarawneh here to provide the full eye-witness account of what took place in Jordan last weekend as hundreds of pro-reform demonstrators came under an orchestrated and sustained attack by regime loyalists during a peaceful sit-in close to the Interior Ministry. Here's an excerpt:

'I am not sure how things spiraled out of control, but from my point of view, having retreated to the neutral area outside the governorate office, I saw two things that contributed to what was about to happen. The first were a series of cars that seemed to be carrying anti-reformists. During the early morning period, these cars were permitted to enter the circle and circle around honking horns and unloading anti-reformists. I use he word “permitted” because all access to the duwar had been cut off by police and the only way these cars (and buses) could get in was either by ramming through the police barricade or being allowed in by the police. This is a very binary conclusion because I really see no other explanation. During that dreadful Friday afternoon, these actions allowed the anti-reformists to grow in numbers. Little did most of the people there know, but there were dozens of cars and buses filled with these people approaching the duwar from the Sports City circle a few kilometers aware.'

All I will add to Naseem's piece is that it says a lot about the insecurity of the Hashemite monarchy that it feels compelled to resort to the crude and inevitably counterproductive strategy of promoting social and ethnic divisions to retain power.

Egypt update

With all the international attention on Libya right now, the first Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have largely faded into the background. The long slog towards democratic change and the nitty gritty of constitutional amendments was never going to be front page news - and i guess the old power networks in both these states are very relieved about that.

Following the referendum, the Egyptian novelist Alaa al-Aswany neatly sums up the state of play in Egypt right now and the danger signs ahead. Read it here.

So what's the Libya endgame?

(AP Photo)

To many, UNSCR 1973 took a long time in coming. The immediate impetus, despite the various conspiracy theories now emerging about a Western plot to grab Libya's energy resources, was to safeguard the citizens of Benghazi from Qaddaffi's advancing army. The Libyan leader, buoyed by military successes in forcing the rebels out of Ajdabiyah and elsewhere, had just hours before the resolution was passed threatened to cleanse Benghazi and show "no mercy". For a leader with a track record of brutality, including the use of foreign mercenaries against his own people, these threats needed to be taken seriously and the international community was right to intervene.

But now the debate has quickly moved on. Apart from the inevitable criticism from the left, who have failed to put forward any credible alternatives to the UN mandated action, already we are beginning to see cracks emerge in the international community and the coalition itself. Yesterday, Russian PM Vladimir Putin compared the military action in Libya to the invasion of Iraq and likened it to the "Crusades", knowing full well the strong impact of this word in the Arab world. China has called for the air strikes to stop. Both Russia and China were among five states that abstained on UNSCR 1973 but nevertheless allowed it to pass. The Arab League, crucial to convincing the Obama administration to throw its support behind the UN resolution, has also wobbled, with its secretary general Amr Moussa voicing criticism before suddenly backtracking, no doubt under political pressure. And now we are hearing that NATO itself is unwilling to take over the operation, with Turkey calling for immediate talks.

There are, of course, good reasons why some of these political actors are wary of supporting the military intervention, even if they either initially signed up or acquiesced to the will of the international community. China, Russia and Turkey have their own restive minorities seeking greater political independence and freedom and however unlikely, would not want a precedence set for liberal interventionism. Likewise, the under pressure dictators of the Arab League are paradoxically attempting to demonstrate their support for their 'Libyan brothers' to appease their own populations in the grip of revolutionary fervour, whilst at the same time becoming increasingly wary of the aims of the coalition in pursuing actual regime change. However, what unites them all is the deep misgivings and an unwillingness to fully commit politically to a project whose aims are obscure and whose success is far from sure. What would have been an easier operation weeks ago has now become considerably more difficult.

As such, the longer the military campaign continues and the more the coalition inevitably gets drags into this conflict the more these cracks will deepen. It is clear that the goal of the US, Britain and France in particular is regime change. Europe does not want to be left with a pariah state on its southern borders ruled by a dictator with a track record in supporting terrorism. The US likewise does not want the headache of dealing with a rogue state that will inevitably seek to revive its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, backed by the country's energy reserves (and China and Russia securing lucrative contracts). Also, if Qaddafi succeeds in suppressing the rebellion there is the danger that other Arab states will follow suit, resulting in more regional instability and the prospect of multiple armed insurrections. On the other hand, if the US is seen to overtly side with the rebels militarily then other opposition movements in the Arab world and possibly the Gulf, will feel more emboldened to challenge their respective regimes. This dilemma - along with the uncertainly of what comes after Qaddafi - goes a long way to explaining the current hedging on the part of the coalition.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1973 the coalition has set about degrading Qaddafi's military capabilities largely under the pretext of humanitarian intervention in the hope that this will be enough to fracture the military while at the same time tip the balance of power in favour of the rebels. It may yet work. So far, however, the signs are less than positive. This is not Afghanistan in 2001 where the US used the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban while providing overwhelming air power. At present, the rebels appear to lack the military organisation and means to take the fight to Qaddafi and a stalemate looks like a distinct possibility. The outcome could well be the partition of Libya and a prolonged conflict, as it seems unlikely that neither side would accept this scenario. Furthermore, would the coalition accept such an outcome? If not, are coalition warplanes going to bomb Qaddafi's forces to clear the route to Tripoli? Too many questions and so few answers. And this is before we even consider what comes next if Qaddafi does fall. Foreign Policy has some analysis here.

Obama resurrects the UN

Like many others, I have been fairly critical of the Obama administration’s policy drift and lack of leadership since the start of the Arab uprisings. And while I still stand by this view in general, the outcome of last night’s vote at the UNSC was a clear victory for Obama’s philosophy of multilateralism and international law over the unilateral policies of the US in recent years. But why did it take so long in coming?

Less than three weeks ago Qaddafi was surrounded by opposition forces. To all intents and purposes it looked like the game was up. But sensing a lack of political will for military intervention on the part of the US in particular the Libyan leader was able to push back. It appears that in the end Obama’s hand was forced. He did not want to be the president on whose watch Qaddafi butchered his people and neither did the US or Europe want a pariah reeking chaos across North Africa and beyond, and possibly resorting the terrorism and reviving his chemical weapons programme in the process.

But there were other considerations. Apart from having no strategical interest in Libya, the US is already fighting wars in two Muslim countries and the Generals and Obama seemed deeply reluctant to take the lead in another. Accordingly, Obama let Britain and France do the running, whilst at the same time refusing to sign up until there was clear Arab and African Union support also. Once the Arab league approved the no-fly zone and later some states – notably Qatar and the UAE – pledged to take part in military operations – Obama and the State Department were in a better position to sell the draft proposal of military intervention to a still skeptical Defense Department, probably on the grounds that US military participation would be minimal. By pursuing this path Obama was also able to achieve solid legal backing for military action and also embolden the UN. In the end it was a clever if rather belated strategy.

Whether it will work or not is another story. There are many possible pitfalls ahead, ranging from Qaddafi making good on his threat to target civilian targets to getting bogged down in a protracted conflict. The Western powers will be hoping that the threat of airstrikes may be enough to force Qaddafi to back down and declare a ceasefire. But if he does declare a ceasefire what next? What counts as a ceasefire? Will Qaddafi’s security forces step aside and allow the Libyan people to express their will through peaceful protests? To do so would mark the endgame for a dictator that remains in denial. And if Qaddafi was to declare a ceasefire would the rebels reciprocate? I doubt it. They are far more likely to march on Tripoli in the belief that they have won. Maybe they have.

On a different note, Marc Lynch has an interesting piece on the Foreign Policy Blog about how Bahrain’s leaders are flaming the flames of sectarianism in order to rally regional allies and maintain a monopoly on power.

Why the Libyan revolution mustn’t fail

As protests continue unabated across large parts of the Arab world, many largely unreported, there is a deep sense that the initial euphoria surrounding the ousting of the Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt is beginning to subside and is giving way to harsh realities and protracted struggles.

In Tunisia and Egypt there has been some cause for optimism (and more recently Morocco). Through sheer persistence and bravery the protesters in both these states have managed to achieve considerable concessions. Bit by bit the old political apparatus in Tunisia is being dismantled and replaced. Just yesterday a Tunisian court dissolved the party of the former president just two days after the country’s interim PM announced a new government that will run the country until elections in July. On Monday, the interior ministry also dissolved the country's secret police service, widely accused of committing human rights abuses. These are significant gains though the future is far from certain.

Meanwhile, In Egypt protesters have kept up the pressure on the military, which has drafted some fairly positive proposals for constitutional amendments which will be put to a referendum, the date of which has yet to be specified. Recent pressure has also succeeded in finally ousting the old guard PM Ahmad Shafiq, and others such as the long standing Foreign Minister Ahmed Abou el-Ghait. More recently protesters have been engaged in a concerted effort to prevent the intelligence services from destroying evidence of alleged human rights abuses. This culminated in the storming of the intelligence headquarters. For anyone vaguely familiar with the Middle East and feared Mukhabarat this is really a momentous event. However, significant challenges lie ahead and despite some of the piecemeal concessions outlined above, the future is also far from certain.

Elsewhere in the region the situation is murkier still. Something of a stalemate appears to have taken place in Algeria, Yemen and Bahrain. As such, the prospect for violence will no doubt increase. In other countries such as Jordan, King Abdullah has responded quickly (though mainly in the form of handouts to his East Bank support base) with yet more promises of reforms whilst at the same time installing a new government headed by a former military and intelligence man whose previous stint in office was marked by electoral fraud, the suppression of freedoms and alleged corruption. As is always the case in Jordan, Abdullah’s promises seldom match reality and Jordanians will remain skeptical until they achieve their main goal: changes to the electoral law and a limit on the King’s executive powers (at least from Jordanians of Palestinian origin). Here the King will probably follow a policy of wait and see and try to stall reforms as much as possible fearing a backlash from East Bankers, who in typical Bedouin fashion have been busy extracting their own concessions .

This brings us to Libya. The outcomes of some of the protests mentioned above and possible future ones in Syria or Saudi Arabia may well hinge on what happens here. Arab leaders, though no friends of Qaddafi, will be watching developments in this North African country very closely and no doubt quietly hoping that Qaddafi succeeds in quelling the uprising. If Qaddafi does manage to remain in power (though personally I’m not sure that either the US or EU can allow this to happen, more cynical voices may well argue it would solve many of America’s problems in dissuading other revolutions in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf) through brutal repression this will send a signal to the other despots in the region that it’s OK to employ the same tactics. Apart from a strong case for intervening on humanitarian grounds, this is one of the main reasons that Qaddafi mustn't be allowed to win.

Egyptian revolutionary humour

Taking a break from the intense political developments in the region here is a sample of Egyptian humour during the 18 days of protests in Tahrir Square as demonstrators waited for the departure of Mubarak.

The poster here reads in Arabic: "Go [Mubarak] before my wife kills me. I've only been married for 20 days".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

This one is from the Egyptian Carpenters Association asking Mubarak: "Tell us Mubarak, what type of glue do you use?".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

And this one reads: "Go [Mubarak] the woman wants to give birth and her child doesn't want to see you".

Egyptian revolutionary humour

And this one reads: Go [Mubarak] my hand is hurting me".