Nasrallah backs Assad's repression

Hassan Nasrallah broke his long, long silence on Syria on May 25 and with it probably his reputation throughout the entire Middle East by backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's brutal repression of his people. In a 2008 Zogby poll Nasrallah was voted the most popular leader in the Arab world, a significant achievement for a Shia leader in a Sunni-dominated region. After his recent comments in support of Assad, however, i doubt he will retain this position for much longer.

I think it's fair to say that Ranna Kabbani's post on the al-Bab blog just about sums up the feelings of betrayal felt by the Syrian people as they witness one of their former heroes and self-styled champion of the oppressed side against them in their time of need. Describing Nasrallah's speech, Kabbani states:

"As ever, it took on the mythic pageantry of a Passion Play. Nasrallah began by urging his many listeners to suffer the few hours of their wait in the burning sun to hear him, as a way of sharing the burning experience of all those who suffered and sacrificed so greatly to bring this occasion about.

"He then broke his long, long silence on the popular intifada in Syria, only to side totally and categorically with the killers in the Syrian regime. As a Syrian watching this, who knows what great popularity Nasrallah once enjoyed in her country, where photos of him were on display everywhere – making his the only face ever allowed to be added to the Assad iconography of Father, Son and Holy Ghost – or Hafiz, Bashar and the departed Basil – so depravedly and cynically modelled on Christian religious belief. I felt viscerally that something had shifted irrevocably as the chairman uttered his unfortunate words. No wonder that his image was torched almost at once after this speech in Deraa and Muaddamiyya and Homs and Hama and Bou Kamal and other centres of our intifada."

Bahrain: targetting the medics

A Physicians for Human Rights investigation last month into the brutal and systematic abuse of pro-democracy protesters has resulted in some disturbing, yet perhaps predictable, findings.

The reports authors - both medical doctors - conducted interviews with 47 medical workers, patients and other eyewitnesses and corroborated testimonies by conducting physical examinations of beaten and tortured protesters, as well as deaths in custody. The report also produced strong evidence that the al-Khalifah regime had systematically targetted medical staff, including abductions of doctors, some of whom were taken from their homes in the middle of the night by security forces. The report concluded that the Bahraini authorities:

• Attacked ambulances; removed ambulance medics, and forced them to give their uniforms to police who then posed as medics to get closer to protesters;
  


• Prevented ambulances from reaching people who needed medical care;



• Blockaded health facilities and obstructed delivery of care;



• Militarized the country's main tertiary care hospital, preventing medical staff and patients from entering or leaving;



• Destroyed medical records;



• Abducted medical professionals, detained and held them incommunicado;



• Hunted down patients wounded in protests by searching medical centers and setting up police check points;



• Humiliated, beat, and tortured patients while in medical centers;



• Forcibly discharged patients in need of urgent medical care.

Of course, Bahrain's security forces are the backbone of the al-Khalifah regime with large numbers of their personnel recruited from other countries, including Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen (a main reason why the GCC's club of Kings is making overtures to Jordan and its well trained security forces). Bahrain's Shia majority, meanwhile, is mostly excluded from positions in the security forces.

Assad plays Israel card

With mounting pressure domestically, the Syrian regime cynically played its Israel card yesterday by allowing Palestinians commemorating al-Nakba day (meaning catastrophe) - the day Israel was created in 1948 - to storm the border fences and become targets for Israeli bullets. Since 1974, the Syrians have guarded the border closely, fearing Israeli reprisals for any possible Palestinian guerrilla activity in the region.

Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric and championing of the Palestinian cause, a quiet border on the Syrian front (of course this does not apply to Lebanon which has paid dearly for Syria's attempts to regain the Golan Heights through supporting Hezbollah) has been a top priority of the Assad dynasty over the past 38 years. In fact, you could argue that Syria's ability to maintain a peaceful border with Israel has been too successful, leading the Israelis to conclude that there is no need to enter peace talks to resolve the issue of the occupied territories, under Israeli control since 1967. Yesterday's border incursions, therefore, where a typically crude attempt by the Assad regime to remind Israel, the US, Lebanon and Jordan of the sought of chaos that could unfold if the ruling Allawite clan in Damascus where to fall and to buy time for its brutal repression. But will it work?

The problem with this strategy for Assad is that it also highlights to the US and Israel how far the Allawite clan in Damascus is willing to go to retain power. The old saying "there is nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal" clearly comes to mind and no doubt will provoke some debate in Washington and Tel-Aviv. As such, the tactic may well backfire and lead to the conclusion that the Syrian leader is becoming more of a liability than an asset. Furthermore, with the Syrian regime, despite continuing protests, not under any immediate short term threat of being toppled, it will also raise questions regarding how far Assad would actually go if the Syrian regime where to face a more serious challenge in the future.

Update: Palestine unity deal

Following on from the previous post, Middle East Chanel has an interesting interview with Mustafa Barghouti on the new Palestinian unity deal. Read it here.

Hamas-PA unity accord: a few thoughts

The ripple first tangible ripple effect of the so-called Arab spring on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict revealed itself on Wednesday with the signing of a Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity accord.

After four years of hostility following Hamas' 2006 election victory, the two key Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas have agreed to set up a unified caretaker government which will pave the way for new elections. So after years of animosity and repeated failed attempts to reach a compromise, why now?

Firstly, Egypt's secret role in brokering the agreement appears to be the first clear sign that the country's de facto new ruler and long-time defence chief, Mohammad Tantawi, is far less rigid towards the Islamist movement than his former boss Husni Mubarak. This new position is being driven by pragmatism rather than any love for the Brotherhood and reflects the changed political landscape in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak, which has left the remnant of Mubarak's NDP party and the Islamists in the driving seat - for now.

If and when civilian rule is restored, the military, which controls a big slice of the economy, will want to preserve its privileges and may seek a background role as 'national guardian'. It remains unclear what role the Islamist will play in the future political system. This will depend on how well the Brotherhood performs in the September election. If the group performs well, it will feel emboldened and no doubt seek greater power. In the meantime, all sides will be hedging their bets and the country's military rulers will be looking to build support among the Islamists. The signing of the recent Hamas-PA accord will therefore boost the military's political capital in an uncertain landscape.

Secondly, although the new nuanced regional approach of Egypt towards Hamas and Iran, compared to Mubarak's staunch alliance with the US and Israel, is certainly a factor in bridging the divide between the PA and Hamas, there is also a strong dose of realism on the part of both Palestinian factions. Both must be aware that the so-called Arab Spring may be heading their way and that a failure to move forward may result in a backlash from a Palestinian public fed up with poor governance, bickering and infighting.

For Hamas, the threats on the horizon appear more obvious. After four years in charge of Gaza they have failed to deliver any tangible economic benefits and have ruled over a population largely cut off from the outside world, in main as a result of Israel's cruel blockade. Nevertheless, Gaza's population will not indefinitely put up with the status-quo. Furthermore, the largely secular-driven Arab uprisings - though Islamist parties may emerge as future benefactors -have largely undermined Hamas' message and portrayed the group as belonging to the past rather than the future. This image will only be reinforced by Hamas' alliance with Iran and Syria. Both states have resorted to severe repression in order to quell their own opposition movements and images of largely Sunni Muslim Syrian protesters being shot in the streets by an Allawi-dominated military will not resonate well with the overwhelmingly Sunni Palestinian popualtion.

For the PA, the accord with Hamas appears to be aimed at shoring up its flagging popularity, pleasing the new regime in Egypt, and an attempt to offset challenges to its authority stemming from the Arab spring. More crucially, however, it represents a conviction that any negotiations with Israel so long as Netanyahu is in power are a non-starter. It also signifies the PA's lack of faith in the Obama administration's ability to have any influence over the current Israeli government and the death of the so-called peace process itself.

All eyes will now be on the reaction of the US and the Quartet. Will it once again demand that the new government must recognize Israel and honour the agreements already signed with it? If the quartet sticks to its previous position that Hamas must recognise Israel's right to exist and reject armed struggle then all sides will be back to square one. Mind you, they never got to stage two anyway.