Revolution or strategic maneuvering?

According to the Oxford dictionary definition, a revolution is the "forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system". Given this definition, can we really refer to the mass uprisings in the Arab world as revolutions? Libya may yet prove to be the exception here but I think we need to be very careful before defining the Tunisian and Egyptian models as revolutions yet. Revolutions in progress may be a more accurate description. By defining them as revolutions there is an obvious danger of lending credence to these regimes that real change in the power structures of these states has already taken place when in reality not that much has changed beyond some recycling of old faces, particularly in Egypt where the Mubarak cabinet (bar a few exceptions) along with the emergency laws etc ... remain firmly in place.

Of course, it's early days and the speed with which events have been unfolding makes it difficult to keep up. But despite the remarkable achievements and courage of the Arab publics it remains a fact that the key slogan of the uprisings - al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam (the people demand the fall of the regime) is a long way from being achieved in any of the states (though again, Libya may prove the exception). The key challenge for the protest movements now is to maintain and sustain the momentum whilst working to institutionalise their gains and transform them into a system of pluralistic and democratic politics. This will prove a difficult task given the weak and fragmented nature of the various opposition parties which are pitted against the wily, organised regimes that remain firmly entrenched and as such have a significant advantage in shaping the future 'reform process'.

In Egypt in particular, the military - which has effectively been in power since 1952 - is at present in a strong position to shape the outcome. And so far, there have been precious few signs that it is committed to real reform with a real absence of confidence building measures. Such measures could include an immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the freeing of political prisoners and respecting freedom of assembly and the rights of independent trade unions. The lack of progress is hardly surprising. The military has so far played an ambivalent role and its primary goal has been retaining stability while preserving its political influence and business interests. After all, this is the very reason it eventually and reluctantly decided that Mubarak should go.

Some clues to how far the military is committed to real reform will soon be revealed and will include: the level of input from opposition parties into the new constitution and the parameters of the new electoral law. The timescale for reforms will also prove telling. If the military seeks to rush through these changes the likelihood is that it's main aim is to generally preserve the status quo, while introducing slightly more opposition voices into the new parliament, particularly ones that are susceptible to cooption.

Past examples of reforms in the Arab world do not bode well. In 1989 Algeria experienced widespread civil unrest that forced the regime into constitutional reforms and allowed greater freedoms. However, when the elections of 1992 resulted in a landslide for the Islamist opposition the government quickly backtracked and cancelled the result. The result was a bloody civil war and one that Algerians will not want to repeat. Also in 1989, Jordan ended 23-years of martial law in response to growing instability in the regime's tribal heartlands, restored parliamentary democracy and extended freedom of assembly and expression. However, after appeasing the protesters the Hashemite monarchy quickly backtracked and introduced a raft of temporary laws to undermine the brief democratic gains.

The same is true for Bahrain. After years of serious unrest in the 1990s, on taking power King Hamad introduced a series of reforms, held a constitutional referendum and transformed the state into a constitutional monarchy. Again, the regime quickly backtracked and has since proved unwilling to give up its control over the key instruments of state. If the brave actions of the pro-democracy forces are to be translated into real gains, then we need to be aware that the revolution has only just begun and that a long battle remains ahead. The temptation of the regimes will be to procrastinate and wait. The challenge of the pro-democracy protesters will be to sustain the momentum until all their demands have been met.

Libya: time for international intervention

From the shell of his former home, which was bombed by the Americans in 1986, a defiant Qaddafi dressed in full tribal attire gave what has to be one of the most bizarre speeches in the history of a dictator desperately clutching at power. The choice of setting along with Qaddafi's dress code were, of course, carefully chosen to project Qaddafi's image as that of a vanguard of Libya's independence while appealing to Libya's tribes for support.

Qaddafi's speech - typically rambling and long on rhetoric - was peppered with delusional allegations towards foreign powers, infantile language and overt threats towards those "cockroaches" and "rats" responsible for the uprising now taking place in Libya. According to Qaddafi's world, seditious forces had infiltrated Libya and drugged the youth, sending them out into the streets to cause chaos. By the time the dictator began reading from his Green Book most news channels had lost interest, along with just about everyone else. If anyone still harboured any doubts about Qaddafi's sanity, this speech proved once and for all that he is seriously ill.

But behind Qaddafi's madness and bizarre accusations, including attempts to portray what is happening as an imperialist plot on the part of Western powers to re-colonize Libya and grab its huge energy resources, lay a simple message: the Libyan dictator will do everything in his power to maintain his rule and crush the rebellion, "house by house".

Here, the international community needs to take the dictator at his word. Qaddafi has offered no concessions to the Libyan people apart from submission to his will. He has deducted from events in Tunisia and Egypt that to give any ground to the opposition will mark the beginning of the end of his 42-year rule. Credible reports have already emerged that Qaddafi has used live ammunition and military aircraft to indiscriminately attack demonstrators. In order to avoid what could turn into a Rwandan style bloodbath, the international community, including the US, EU, UN, NATO, and the Arab League (where he has few friends) must now act.

This statement by the International Crisis Group clearly spells out the actions that now need to be taken.

Libya: Protests gathering pace

Photo: Reuters

Although the situation in Libya remains confusing due to the lack of journalists and communications in the country, it does appear that momentum is building against the 42-year rule of Colonel Qaddafi. According to the latest reports, protesters have taken control of several major towns in the East of the country (and are now facilitating the entry of foreign journalists and NGOs). The protests have now spread throughout the country with the opposition planing to march on Tripoli, where demonstrations have already started.

As happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain, the initial use of violence in an attempt to stamp out the demonstrations has backfired and united the opposition against the regime. As the number of dead has increased so has the number of protesters on the streets. Meanwhile, Qaddafi's use of foreign mercenaries to brutally suppress the demonstrations has further fuelled anger and lead to greater resentment. Accordingly, this has resulted in defections among top officials and diplomats, as well as uniting some of the country's powerful tribes against Qaddafi. The 500,000-strong Tuareg tribe in south Libya has reportedly joined with the million-strong Warfala tribe in opposition to Qaddafi's rule. And it's numbers that matter here and could lead to the toppling of the dictator.

Whatever happens next it's likely to be bloody. There is no reason to expect Qaddafi to bow to very slowly growing international pressure to limit the use of deadly force. As outlined in the televised address by his son, Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi appears to believe that his country's vast oil wealth (and its subsequent investment potential; so far £43 billion making it a major shareholder in companies such as Italy's Fiat and Juventus Football Club, along with a huge property portfolio in London and elsewhere) leaves his regime immune from criticism.

Over the past few years Western companies have been queueing at the Colonel's door to gain contracts. Some of these contracts are now proving embarrassing, or rather awkward. For example, In May 2008, the US company General Dynamics secured a £102m contract to arm the Libyan army's 'elite' second brigade (run by Qaddafi's son Khamis), the very same force that has been using live ammunition against protesters in Benghazi, leading to scores of deaths. Britain has also been active in pushing arms Libya's way. British arms sales to Libya in the first nine months of 2010 reached over £200m.

Meanwhile, international oil companies have been lining up for lucrative contracts. Shell signed a deal with the Libyan government in 2005 to explore and develop five areas in the Sirte basin and was also awarded a gas exploration permit in 2007. BP, meanwhile, secured a $900 million deal in 2007, which the company said at the time was its largest single exploration commitment. ExxonMobil in February 2008 agreed to invest $97 million plus tens of millions in fees in offshore hydrocarbon exploration while a host of other global firms have also been awarded contracts.

The international diplomatic and business courting of the Libyan regime - beginning with Blair seven years ago and a hand shake in a tent - has left Qaddafi feeling emboldened and judging by his ego, probably invincible. However, this time he may have just miscalculated the situation and pushed his luck too far.

Bahrain: back to the bad old days

AP photo

The reaction of the Bahrain security forces to the pro-democracy protests - including the storming and killing of demonstrators at the protest camp at Pearl Roundabout - has finally exposed the brutality of the al-Khalifah regime and exposed the myth of the country's so-called reform process.

On taking power in 1999, king Hamad introduced a series of reforms aimed at building national unity after years of violence had scarred the kingdom during the long rule of his father, Sheikh Isa. The initial measures, such as the release of political prisoners, the right of return for exiled opposition leaders and the abolishment of the kingdom’s state security courts, succeeded in quelling the Shia unrest and ushered in a period of relative calm.

However, the new constitution issued in 2002 quickly put and end to aspirations for a new era of political openness. The new constitution gave the elected lower house fewer legislative powers than what it had enjoyed under the old constitution, while at the same time created an appointed upper house with greater powers. Nevertheless, the kingdom’s largest opposition group, al-Wefaq, entered the political process but has achieved precious little since, resulting in an increase in tensions and a revert to the more repressive system of governance characteristic of the late Sheikh Isa period.

As such, tensions have been rising between the regime and opposition activists in Shia populated areas in recent years, triggering a cycle of arrests and further demonstrations as the government has resorted to force to break up the protests. The violence witnessed over the past few days therefore is nothing new, though the repression of the regime has intensified. The unrest is being fuelled by the same issues affecting other MENA states, including lack of job opportunities, growing economic disparities, cosmetic reforms, corruption, and in the case of Bahrain, a strong sectarian dimension between the predominantly ruling Sunni elite and Bahrain’s poorer Shia majority.

Resentment is also high over the ruling family’s ongoing policy of trying to reduce the kingdom’s two-thirds majority Shia population by granting citizenship and jobs to Sunni Muslim Arabs and South Asian migrants that are denied to Shia Bahrainis, most notably in the security forces - the very same security forces that are now brutally attacking the native citizens of the country.

The Sunni elite has long sought to portray the Shia majority as a fifth column working for Iran. This is a baseless allegation but one that holds some sway in the US, particularly in the current geo-political climate and Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions. Bahrain is, of course, also home to the US Navy's Central Command and Fifth Fleet.

In sum, Bahrain’s political reforms - like most so-called reforms in the region - have so far taken place without requiring the ruling establishment to give up any of its privileges and its control over economic resources, state institutions, the army and the security services. Any meaningful opening up of the political system has ran up against fierce resistance from hardliners, led by the much despised prime minister, Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in power since 1971 and along with his cronies stands to lose long-standing economic and social privileges.

Last night's attack on the pro-democracy camp proves that such intransigent forces within the regime are in no mood to compromise and have learned nothing from the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt. Of all the MENA states now experiencing unrest - Bahrain's (along with Yemen) may turn out to be the bloodiest. Given the US military presence in the country, the US will need to respond quickly and clearly lay down the red lines to avoid a further escalation of violence.

p.s. And let's not forget which country has been arming Bahrain's police force: Britain

Egypt: the challenges ahead

Now that Mubarak has gone the difficult work in Egypt begins: the transition to a genuine democracy and the task of wrenching the reins of power out of the miltary's hands and into civilian control. This will be no easy task.

For the past 60 years the military has had a vested interest in the political and economic power structure preserved by successive Presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak - all military men. As Mohammad Ayoob puts it in Foreign Policy: " To expect the military to relinquish its corporate interests for the sake of popular welfare is likely to turn out to be delusion".

With the personalisation of the protests geared towards toppling Mubarak , what is striking now is how little has really changed. The 'Mubarak regime' is still very much in power and the country remains in the hands of the former President's top generals. One old general has been replaced by another old general, with even more power and less accountability than Mubarak had.

This is not to detract from the gains of the protest movement and the huge - if currently symbolic - achievements in ousting an Arab dictator and crossing the fear barrier. The Egyptian people have every right to celebrate what is still a remarkable achievement and for which many paid the highest price. But in practical terms nothing has actually changed yet. It is quite difficult to envisage a 'real revolution' that leaves the former power structures not only in place (and expects them to drive change), but also in a more commanding position than before.

Of course, it is very early days and we shall have to wait and see how much power the military is willing to concede. However, it is worrying to see (so far at least) that Mubarak's final cabinet remains in place. It is also not clear what role the despised and now throroughly discredited Omar Suleiman will play in the 'new Egypt'. Furthermore, that hated state of emergency law remains firmly in place.

There are other alarm bells. The military has issued orders outlawing labour strikes, and now it has achieved its aim of retaining power, it has appeared increasingly willing to resort to force to put an end to the demonstrations, which are now slated to take place every Friday until all the pro-democracy movement's demands are fully met, including: the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, a civilian transitional council, a new Constitution, the legalisation of all political parties and labour unions, and the prosecution of security forces implicated in murder and torture and the trial of Mubarak, among others.

It is difficult to see how the military will be able to meet all of these demands and respond the heightened aspirations of the Egyptians people without either resorting to repression to maintain order or undermining the very military power structure on which the Egyptian state is based, along with the vast corporate interests and informal power networks. In short, the Egyptian revolution has only just begun.

Egypt: Mubarak's last hours

Interesting reports have now emerged concerning Husni Mubarak's last hours in power, and his desperate attempts to hold on to the Presidency. A detailed account published in al-Ahram relates how the military expected Mubarak to announce his resignation on Thursday, along with the Americans and just about everyone else. However, according to the report, his son Gamal - who was being groomed to succeed his father - along with some of his top aides (and most probably the Saudis) were advising the beleaguered President that he could still ride out the turmoil and hang on to power.

Insiders gave the Associated Press a glimpse into the final hours before Mubarak fell. Their accounts paint a picture of an isolated dictator, unable or unwilling, to grasp the reality that nothing short of his immediate departure could save the country from descending into chaos. According to the AP:

"He did not look beyond what Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said the official. "Every incremental move (by Mubarak) was too little too late." The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice president, to end the protests."

According to the account in al-Ahram, "military leaders threatened to publish their own statement announcing that Mubarak had been sacked. The newspaper said a statement announcing Mubarak's resignation was pre-recorded by the army's chief-of-staff, Sami Enan, and delivered to the offices of the state television broadcaster Nile TV."
In the end, however, the military's statement was not required after Vice President Omar Suleiman agreed at the last minute to read his own 49 second statement that finally brought to an end Mubarak's 30-year rule.

Egypt: Just a short hop to Jeddah

It's getting really difficult to analyze the situation in Egypt amidst increasingly conflicting reports regarding the role of the army in all of this. I for one, always had my suspicions about the double handed game the army has been playing since the protests began. It failed, after all, to defend the protesters when they came under a brutal attack from Mubarak's paid thugs and by most eyewitness accounts, actually facilitated the entry of the NDP goons into Tahrir Square. The regime was no doubt hoping then that the resort to violence would have been enough to end the demonstrations.

Now it appears, though the situation is extremely uncertain, that the army - or at least the high command - is supporting Mubarak's desire to see out his presidential term and preside over the transition period. This may yet change again. There are reports now that Mubarak has fled to Sharm el-Sheikh - no doubt to consult with the two Abdullahs (Jordan and Saudi), both of whom have been urging Mubarak to hold onto power. Most likely, Mubarak's top generals (Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sami Einan) , also thought it would be a good idea for the President to take a break in an attempt to relieve tensions. The problem is, the protesters will only be happy when he makes the trip across the Red Sea to Jeddah.

Right now, I don't believe any analyst can predict the outcome. The scenarios are far too numerous and range from the sudden departure of the President and possibly Suleiman, to the complete fracture of the army between the old (Mubarak's men) and new guard. Leaked cables reveal US concerns about the army. Sensing that the tide is firmly against the old guard, will the younger generation of officers make a move? The only certainty is that the military will eventually decide the final outcome, the problem being that it itself appears to be in disarray.

Enter the Americans. The Obama administration's role has also been ambiguous. It began with Clinton's now infamous remark that the regime was "stable" (well technically she was right, just a pity it's loathed by the people). From the start the US regarded what was taking place as a huge geo-strategic headache, and hoped it would blow over quickly. When the administration realised that Mubarak was finished it quickly swung its weight behind Suleiman, no doubt with the backing of the Israelis, regardless of the fact that Suleiman is possibly more despised than Mubarak himself. Since then, the US has become increasingly vocal in calling for change, though notably has refrained from calling for Mubarak to go. The US admittedly has many strategic concerns, and is possibly also worried about what may be revealed when the regime collapses.

Interestingly, America's $1.3 billion in military aid appears to have given the US less leverage than one would imagine. I'm sure the US has had an impact on curtailing the regime's use of violence, but little else it seems. This may be partly due to the fact that if the US where to withdraw its aid package, it would have even less influence over events in the region. However, it is also clear that Mubarak's main backer - Saudi Arabia - is doing all it can to prop the ailing dictator up. King Abdullah has reportedly told the Americans that Mubarak must be allowed to complete his term and leave with dignity. The Saudi King has also pledged to step in with funding to cover any cut in aid from the US. No doubt, one of the reasons the regime feels it can withstand the huge economic losses right now is that it has secured Saudi backing.

Or maybe, it is just taking Mubarak and his cronies all this time to sort out their assets before the Swiss decide to freeze them?

Jordan: bending over backwards

The Jordanian regime is worried, overly so in my opinion. Since the protest began in Tunisia the Hashemites have been quick off the mark to coopt opposition forces (possibly with some US pressure to contain the unrest sweeping the region).

Firstly, the regime announced that it would subsidise basic food and energy. Secondly, it announced a public sector wage increase of $20 per month. Thirdly, King Abdullah sacked the government; and fourthly we are now hearing that the new PM, Marouf Bakhit, has been in negotiation with the Islamic Action Front and has offered the Islamist movement several positions in the new cabinet. The Islamist, feeling in a rather strong position right now despite having no representation in parliament, rather cleverly refused the offer, saying that ' they would rather be part of the process in an elected government'.

A delegation from the Muslim Brotherhood met with Bakhit on Sunday and according to a statement on the Islamist organisation's website presented the PM with a list of 14 demands, including: a new elections law, amending the Public Gatherings Law, the establishment of a teachers association, more public freedoms, and dissolving the current Parliament and electing a new Lower House under the new law.

Bakhit is still in the process of forming his new Cabinet, the composition of which should give some clues as to how serious the regime is concerning reform.

Egypt: procrastinate and wait

The process of change - or rather non-change - is beginning to take shape in Egypt. Backed by Washington and the EU (along with Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), Omar Suleiman has emerged as the preferred strongman to oversee the so-called 'transition to democracy'. Just one problem: he is neither trusted by the people nor the opposition groups. The key slogan of this peaceful revolution has been: 'al-Sha'b Yurid Isqat al-Nizam' (The people want an end to this regime). No one is more symbolic of this regime after Mubarak than Suleiman.

Without seeking to be too pessimistic, Washington's decision to back Suleiman would appear to suggest that those who have argued throughout these events that US strategic interests must come first have triumphed over pro-democracy voices. Since this uprising began the US administration has been deeply divided on how to respond, which explains Washington's constantly shifting positions over the past two weeks. Interestingly, events in Egypt have also revealed divisions within the traditionally pro-Israel neoconservative supporters of the Bush era, with hawks such as Elliott Abrams and Robert Kagan arguing that Mubarak should go.

However, the momentum now appears to be with the 'better the devil you know' advocates. This is hardly surprising given that caution has been the watchword during the Obama presidency. And in this context, Omar Suleiman is the obvious candidate. With a military career spanning almost six decades, Suleiman enjoys the support of the army and security forces and forms a link between Egypt's military and political elites. Furthermore, as Mubarak's trusted ally and confidant, he also shares the president's views on the key regional issues, from Israel to Iran, and is therefore crucial to maintaining Washington's strategic interests in the region. He has also served the US in its 'war on terror' and the controversial CIA renditions programme.

According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, his 18 career as Intelligence Chief has been marked by 'widespread abuses and torture' and has played a commanding role in suppressing political dissent and free speech. Indeed, Suleiman was considered Egypt's 'torture-in-chief' for terror suspects and is widely known to hold strong anti-Islamist sentiments. Recent and timely cables released by Wikileaks also reveal Suleiman's long history of citing the Islamist threat to justify years of authoritarian rule. He is also an integral part of Egypt's vast patronage (Mubarak has an estimated fortune of $80 billion) network that has - like similar Arab regimes - regarded Egypt as a private ATM to be plundered at will.

The tactic of the regime now - with perceived US backing - appears to be: procrastinate and wait. After exhausting all other strategies, (repression, media control, fermenting chaos through hired thugs, pretending the military is on the side of the people etc ... ), the regime is now holding out the carrot of reforms in the hope of dividing the 'official opposition' and isolating the 'real opposition' (those in Tahrir Square). A the same time it continues to detain activists. If the regime can succeed in making deals with Egypt's weak opposition parties, though this is not guaranteed, it hopes the protesters will eventually be forced to pack up their tents and go home (and wait for the dreaded knock on the door from Suleiman's security thugs).

The opposition's lack of unity is its Achilles Heel. The various parties and non-parties need to quickly agree on a set of demands and stick to them until the regime yields. The mass protests over the past two weeks and the losses suffered at the hands of the Mubarak-Suleiman security goons now need to be protected if Egypt is to move forward. The protesters after all have the greatest weapon: the demographic factor, a youthful population that has the stamina to keep the protests alive.

On a side note, nervous Arab regimes have been adopting and array of tactics to contain the possibility of the unrest spreading, with the European Union funded Palestinian security forces clamping down in the Occupied West Bank.

Egypt: the Pharaoh sends in the cavalry

Mubarak is nothing if not a survivor, and yesterday proved he has no intention of pushing Egypt towards a more democratic future. What transpired was a clever, if rather crudely, orchestrated plan by the regime to take back control. The first sign that things were about to go badly came when the Internet returned, then came the pro-Mubarak supporters, strategically placed in front of Western media offices to gain maximum coverage; and later the attack on the pro-democracy protesters by paid thugs armed with sticks, knives and other weapons.

To an extent the regime’s tactics have worked. Several Western media broadcasts began framing what was taking place as a genuine reaction to the growing instability by pro-Mubarak supporters desperate to get back to work to feed their families. It was, of course, nothing of the sort, but rather a tried and tested strategy by the Mubarak regime to orchestrate its forces, including remnants of the police state that had melted away last week after Mubarak called in the Army, against pro-democracy supporters. Photos of the IDs of security officials captured by pro-democracy protesters have been published on Flickr.

Where to from here? What is clear so far is that the protesters have not made any significant dent in the military’s chain of command. Furthermore, although the regime is attempting to portray the army as neutral, yesterday the army appeared to be playing a double game of non-intervention while at the same time facilitating the entry of the pro-Mubarak thugs into Tahrir Square. I would like to be proved wrong, but US procrastination over the past ten days also appears to have been largely aimed at preserving the status-quo, with or without Mubarak. Hilary Clinton is already addressing General Omar Suleiman is if he were the new leader. Once again, the US appears to have chosen stability over democracy, but will achieve neither.

If the Obama administration continues to pursue this course, it will have missed a great and historic opportunity to steer the region to a more positive future. And if the outcome of this genuine popular uprising ends in a new military regime headed by General Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian state will become more repressive and illegitimate than ever. In this environment radical Islamism will grow, and the emergence of non-state armed groups challenging the status quo will increase, not just in Egypt, but across the entire region.

Robert Springborg has a well argued and rather pessimistic assessment of the situation in Egypt on FP’s Middle East Chanel in which he takes this argument further. He contends that the chance for democratic transition has already passed and Mubarak’s backers in the military will remain firmly in control, backed by the Obama administration. I really hope he is wrong, but my head is beginning to tell me he may be right.

Mubarak drags Egypt into the abyss

After warning in his speech last night that the opposition is attempting to drag the country into violence and anarchy, Mubarak has set out today to do just that. After a week of peaceful protests and the blossoming of civil society – with anti-government protesters taking responsibility for civic duties such as cleaning the streets - it appears by all independent accounts that Mubarak has decided to send his National Democratic Party thugs into Tahrir Square in an attempt to break up the demonstrations and prove that only he has the power to bring order, or disorder.

According to most independent eye-witness reports, the pro-Mubarak supporters were bussed into Cairo and came prepared for violence, carrying clubs, knives and other small weapons, indicating that the violence was clearly orchestrated in an attempt to stamp out the protests. Journalists and others have also recognised some of the pro-Mubarak supporters as plain clothed policemen. It is uncertain what role the military has played here, but it has so far not intervened. This appears to indicate that the generals are happy to let this situation continue and there have been some accusations that the military actually facilitated the entry of the pro-Mubarak forces into the square.

This appears to be a final throw of the dice by Mubarak to create as much disorder as possible and sow fear among the Egyptian population in a desperate attempt to hold on to power. It is unlikely to work. International condemnation at the turn of events is beginning to build momentum. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and others have condemned the use of violence against peaceful protesters. Yet the US State Department is still calling on all sides “to show restraint and avoid violence”, adding that “Egypt's path to democratic change must be peaceful.” But it was peaceful until Mubarak’s thugs attacked the protesters. What has to happen before the US finally reins in Mubarak and calls for him to go?

Egypt: Mubarak is going .... but when?

President Husni Mubarak is nothing if not defiant. Last night he yet again portrayed himself as the father of the nation and the bulwark against chaos and disorder. The speech was a last ditch attempt by the dictator to sow fear among the general population and take the sting out of the opposition, which he accused of fermenting anarchy and of engaging in looting and violence. According to the patriarch Mubarak, only he has the ability to steer Egypt through this time of crisis.

Apart from the blatant untruths in the speech - it has been Mubarak's own security forces that have been responsible for most of the violence - the patronising tone and Mubarak's defiance are likely to backfire and merely energise the opposition. Mubarak's decision not to stand for reelection will do nothing to reduce tensions, and will be viewed by many as a trick to cling on to power. Furthermore, it appears that even this announcement came as a result of considerable behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure from the United States, rather than from a genuine understanding of the situation by Mubarak or a commitment to real change.

It is difficult to see how Mubarak can stay in power for eight months. As the former neo-conservative Bush official, Elliot Abrams, put it: "If he'd made this announcement a week ago, much less a month or two months ago, this whole crisis would never have happened. But to do it now, I think he's got to step down." And this view appears to be gaining traction with the Obama administration, which has once again been playing catch-up and changing its tone in response to fast moving developments. Last night Obama said that change should begin "now". However, it is far from certain what the US President means by this. Does he mean that Mubarak should step aside immediately? or that he should begin implementing constitutional reforms without delay? I get the impression the US was hoping that the latter would be enough but this is now looking very unlikely.

The US administration's primary main concern here is, of course, regional stability, intelligence gathering, protecting the flow of goods through Suez and securing the Egyptian border with Israel (Gaza) against arms trafficking etc ... But propping up Mubarak for another eight months is not going to create stability. Already, we are witnessing clashes between pro-Mubarak supporters and opposition demonstrators. The demonstrations themselves are likely to escalate further as Mubarak attempts to stay put, with a planned march on the presidential palace planned for Friday.

If this march goes ahead - or is prevented by the army or the Republican Guard, the situation could quickly spiral out of control into violence and chaos. Also, the longer the demonstrations drag on, the more chance there is that they will spread to other regional states (which they already have). Mubarak and those around him may also revert to sabotage tactics by using the security services and party apparatchiks to cause chaos. There are reports this is already taking place.

What is baffling here is that the US State Department does not appear to have had a contingency plan for a this type of scenario, despite the fact that they have had thirty years to draw one up. And despite the fact that the ailing president - who was due for reelection in September- is 82 years old and up until last week had not designated a successor. At present the State Department is still deliberating what to do about the situation. Let's hope they come up with some answers soon.

Jordan feeling the strain

Beam me up Scotty!

Just a quick post here about my old hunting ground, Jordan. I couldn't resist posting this image of King Abdullah during his guest appearance on Star Treck. Yes, his RH was, and possibly still is, a big Trekky. However, he has no space ship at the moment to whisk him off and no easy answers to the unrest sweeping the region in the wake of the Tunisian uprising.

Despite recent government measures to pump around 500 million dollars into the economy in a bid to help improve living conditions, protests have been held in Amman and other cities over the past three weeks against the government. So today Abdullah bowed to opposition demands and sacked his PM and installed the old tried and tested Marouf Bakhit to form a new cabinet. I predicted this move a couple of days ago and probably more than half of the Jordanian population did also. And really that's the point here. The move was just way too predictable even for the unimaginative Abdullah and will do nothing to appease the opposition.

It also stinks of desperation and makes the King look weak and vulnerable. Bakhit - from the fairly large Abbadi tribe (many of its members live on the outskirts of Amman) is an ex-military and intelligence man and former Ambassador to Israel. He last served as PM in the wake of the Amman suicide attacks in 2005. After serving for 2 years he was relieved of his duties after coming under heavy criticism for backtracking on reforms and curtailing political freedoms. Now he has been installed with a mandate to 'push ahead with reforms'. I doubt a single person in Jordan will believe that this is the reason Abdullah has installed Bakhit. Jordanians have been hearing this mantra of promised reforms now since 1989 - and not much has happened.

Of course, the real reason Abdullah has installed Bakhit has to do with the fact he stems from a prominent tribe, is popular with the military and security services (unlike the previous PM Rifai), has retained good relations with Israel, and is seen as a steady ship in what are increasingly turbulent Middle East waters. But while Abdullah (or probably his old-guard advisors) sees this as the right move to shore up stability, the appointment simply reeks of a bankrupt regime that has completely run out of ideas, is slowly choking on its own patronage network and can't see the wood for the trees. The appointment of Bakhit - who is very much disliked by the opposition, particularly the Islamic Action Front, is only likely to pour fuel on the fire.

This does not mean that I am expecting Abdullah to fall anytime soon or that protests will become violent. I consider any direct challenge to Hashemite rule highly unlikely. Jordan is highly complicated by the Palestinian issue (60% majority Palestinian origin population) and hence their have been no calls for the regime to be ousted, just the government. The opposition, who mainly draw support from the Palestinian-dominated urban areas is weary of crossing Jordan's traditional red lines, i.e. criticising the Hashemite regime. It would also not want to upset the East Bank community who remain largely loyal to Abdullah (if only as a counterweight to the Palestinians). But political tensions are rising in the Kingdom and the appointment of Bakhit will do nothing to dampen them.