Assad plays Israel card

With mounting pressure domestically, the Syrian regime cynically played its Israel card yesterday by allowing Palestinians commemorating al-Nakba day (meaning catastrophe) - the day Israel was created in 1948 - to storm the border fences and become targets for Israeli bullets. Since 1974, the Syrians have guarded the border closely, fearing Israeli reprisals for any possible Palestinian guerrilla activity in the region.

Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric and championing of the Palestinian cause, a quiet border on the Syrian front (of course this does not apply to Lebanon which has paid dearly for Syria's attempts to regain the Golan Heights through supporting Hezbollah) has been a top priority of the Assad dynasty over the past 38 years. In fact, you could argue that Syria's ability to maintain a peaceful border with Israel has been too successful, leading the Israelis to conclude that there is no need to enter peace talks to resolve the issue of the occupied territories, under Israeli control since 1967. Yesterday's border incursions, therefore, where a typically crude attempt by the Assad regime to remind Israel, the US, Lebanon and Jordan of the sought of chaos that could unfold if the ruling Allawite clan in Damascus where to fall and to buy time for its brutal repression. But will it work?

The problem with this strategy for Assad is that it also highlights to the US and Israel how far the Allawite clan in Damascus is willing to go to retain power. The old saying "there is nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal" clearly comes to mind and no doubt will provoke some debate in Washington and Tel-Aviv. As such, the tactic may well backfire and lead to the conclusion that the Syrian leader is becoming more of a liability than an asset. Furthermore, with the Syrian regime, despite continuing protests, not under any immediate short term threat of being toppled, it will also raise questions regarding how far Assad would actually go if the Syrian regime where to face a more serious challenge in the future.

Update: Palestine unity deal

Following on from the previous post, Middle East Chanel has an interesting interview with Mustafa Barghouti on the new Palestinian unity deal. Read it here.

Hamas-PA unity accord: a few thoughts

The ripple first tangible ripple effect of the so-called Arab spring on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict revealed itself on Wednesday with the signing of a Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity accord.

After four years of hostility following Hamas' 2006 election victory, the two key Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas have agreed to set up a unified caretaker government which will pave the way for new elections. So after years of animosity and repeated failed attempts to reach a compromise, why now?

Firstly, Egypt's secret role in brokering the agreement appears to be the first clear sign that the country's de facto new ruler and long-time defence chief, Mohammad Tantawi, is far less rigid towards the Islamist movement than his former boss Husni Mubarak. This new position is being driven by pragmatism rather than any love for the Brotherhood and reflects the changed political landscape in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak, which has left the remnant of Mubarak's NDP party and the Islamists in the driving seat - for now.

If and when civilian rule is restored, the military, which controls a big slice of the economy, will want to preserve its privileges and may seek a background role as 'national guardian'. It remains unclear what role the Islamist will play in the future political system. This will depend on how well the Brotherhood performs in the September election. If the group performs well, it will feel emboldened and no doubt seek greater power. In the meantime, all sides will be hedging their bets and the country's military rulers will be looking to build support among the Islamists. The signing of the recent Hamas-PA accord will therefore boost the military's political capital in an uncertain landscape.

Secondly, although the new nuanced regional approach of Egypt towards Hamas and Iran, compared to Mubarak's staunch alliance with the US and Israel, is certainly a factor in bridging the divide between the PA and Hamas, there is also a strong dose of realism on the part of both Palestinian factions. Both must be aware that the so-called Arab Spring may be heading their way and that a failure to move forward may result in a backlash from a Palestinian public fed up with poor governance, bickering and infighting.

For Hamas, the threats on the horizon appear more obvious. After four years in charge of Gaza they have failed to deliver any tangible economic benefits and have ruled over a population largely cut off from the outside world, in main as a result of Israel's cruel blockade. Nevertheless, Gaza's population will not indefinitely put up with the status-quo. Furthermore, the largely secular-driven Arab uprisings - though Islamist parties may emerge as future benefactors -have largely undermined Hamas' message and portrayed the group as belonging to the past rather than the future. This image will only be reinforced by Hamas' alliance with Iran and Syria. Both states have resorted to severe repression in order to quell their own opposition movements and images of largely Sunni Muslim Syrian protesters being shot in the streets by an Allawi-dominated military will not resonate well with the overwhelmingly Sunni Palestinian popualtion.

For the PA, the accord with Hamas appears to be aimed at shoring up its flagging popularity, pleasing the new regime in Egypt, and an attempt to offset challenges to its authority stemming from the Arab spring. More crucially, however, it represents a conviction that any negotiations with Israel so long as Netanyahu is in power are a non-starter. It also signifies the PA's lack of faith in the Obama administration's ability to have any influence over the current Israeli government and the death of the so-called peace process itself.

All eyes will now be on the reaction of the US and the Quartet. Will it once again demand that the new government must recognize Israel and honour the agreements already signed with it? If the quartet sticks to its previous position that Hamas must recognise Israel's right to exist and reject armed struggle then all sides will be back to square one. Mind you, they never got to stage two anyway.

Syria: a state of fear

It's no surprise that many of Syria's minorities are feeling fearful right now as unrest spreads throughout the country. The current minority Allawite regime, for all its ills, has long been viewed as the protector of minority religious rights and the vanguard of a secular (ish) society.

To gauge the current feeling in the country see Joshua Landis' recent post and the myriad of different voices expressing their fears on what may follow Assad, if the regime falls, and that's a big IF.

For more analysis on Syria, see here and here.

Bahrain update

After a month of repressive crackdowns on pro-reform protesters, including the influx of Saudi troops to shore up the al-Khalifah regime, the government in Bahrain appeared to backtrack for the first time on Friday after coming under criticism from Washington. The criticism centred on the government's decision on Thursday to ban the country's main opposition groups, including al-Wefaq, which withdrew its 18 MPs from the 40-seat parliament in February in protest at the government crackdowns.

It appears that the al-Khalifah regime has taken Washington's silence since the start of the protests as a green light for a total crackdown on the opposition. This 'overstepping of the boundaries' has placed the Obama administration - already facing heavy criticism for its inconsistent stance vis-à-vis the Arab uprisings - in a difficult position. The White House is also aware - unlike the hardliners in Bahrain - that banning the main Shia party will only fuel the unrest and further the chances of a more violent insurrection similar to what took place in the 1990s.

Joost Hiltermann of International Crisis Group has a podcast here on the recent unrest.

Egypt: business as usual

In the first case of its kind since the Egyptian uprising against the Mubarak regime, a military court has sentenced an Egyptian blogger to a three year prison term for publishing "false information and "insulting the armed forces". As Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch points out, the "The ruling [against Maikel Nabil]comes at a time when the Egyptian military is drawing very restrictive red lines around permissible speech". Joe Stork goes on to note:

"Since the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power on February 11, the military has arrested at least 200 protesters and tried scores of them before military courts. Over 150 protesters arrested on March 9 after the military forcibly cleared Tahrir Square of protesters were sentenced to prison terms by military tribunals in Cairo's high-security Tora prison and are still being held."

Syria: Riding out the storm

The regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad seems to have weathered the storm, for now. The regime will take comfort that the army and security services (firmly in the hands of Assad's Allawi minority) stayed loyal and the protest movement that briefly flourished in the provinces failed to take route in the country's three major cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Hama.

The conclusion Assad may draw from this is that Syrians - for the time being - prefer stability. The lessons drawn from political disorder in neighbouring Lebanon, Iraq and now Libya have not been lost on a population that is keenly aware of the fragile ethnic and sectarian make-up of their state. The old saying "order under an unjust leader is better than chaos under a just leader" appears to ring true for many Syrians. But while Assad may take comfort from this - and also from tactical support from the US - he should be wary of complacency.

Syria's youth, like the youth all over the Arab world, have spoken. They may not want to plunge the country into civil conflict but they do demand that the regime responds to their legitimate demands for greater political freedoms, accountable government and better economic prospects. They are no longer apathetic and have sent a clear signal to the regime that things need to change to meet their growing aspirations. It seems clear that the Syrian population has changed even if the regime has not. Communications and social media have dragged the country out of its isolation. The open question now is: can the regime respond to these changes?

Joshua Landis has some interesting observations on the recent unrest here and here.