Will Friday 28th January go down in history?
After three days of protests tomorrow is set to be the biggest test so far for the Mubarak regime, and the authorities are clearly rattled. Egypt is set to go into lockdown tonight with the regime cutting off all Internet access in a desperate bid to hamper communications not only among protesters, but also the flow of information to the outside world. These steps are likely to backfire - as they did in Tunisia - and make the regime appear weak and encourage further protests. All the signals point to an increasingly desperate regime that instead of attempting to appease the protesters (though it's probably well too late for that) with concrete plans for reforms, as urged by the US, is instead resorting to ever greater repression in order to crush the demonstrations.
Up until now, the demonstrations (like Tunisia) have been largely secular in nature and driven by the youth frustrated at unemployment, corruption and police brutality. However, Friday's protests following noon prayers are about to take a different trajectory as they have now received the backing of Egypt's largest organised (and outlawed) political party: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
The decision of the MB not to become directly involved in the protests up until now has been a calculated one, and largely aimed at countering the efforts of the regime to frame what is taking place as an Islamist inspired uprising in the hope of securing international backing. The regime has been playing this bogey card fromthe outset but it has struggled to gain traction. So far , the news reports have largely framed (and rightly) what is taking place in Egypt on the Tunisian model, i.e. a popular youth-led rebellion against the existing order. Sensing this the MB has now decided it's time to enter the fray tomorrow and has thrown its weight behind what will surely be the largest challenge ever to Mubarak's rule.
This turn of events has clearly got the government rattled. Mubarak himself has still made no statement, probably fearing that any appearance will only pour fuel on the fire. With the decision of the MB to throw its hat in the ring - along with the return of Mohammad al-Baradei - today, the protests will be given more support and direction, something they have lacked so far. The opposition is beginning to crystallise and the regime must be worried.
However, I am not expecting Mubarak to leave the country tomorrow. But we may be seeing the beginning of the end and the Egyptians, who regard themselves as the heartbeat of the Arab world, will certainly not want to be outdone by their Tunisian brothers. The gravity of the situation can be grasped through the statement of Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to Britain and the United States, who told Reuters TV a few days ago that "In Egypt, I really can't say where this is going to go".
Just as in Tunisia it will be the role of the military that has the final say here. Unlike Ben Ali, Mubarak is a military man and has always enjoyed the support of the armed forces. Unlike Ben Ali - who was always weary of a military coup- Mubarak has always ensured that the military is well looked after - largely with $1.4 billion of US assistance. A quick look at the figures reveals the difference between Tunisia and Egypt in terms of military expenditure, 1.4% of GDP against 3.4% of GDP, respectively.
So the question is: with the momentum building at what point will the police and military (who themselves have families) stop aiming their weapons at the people and instead join them? and at what point will the military sense the game is over and make a move?
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Egypt Update
OK, so thousands of protesters have turned out right across Egypt and the latest reports point to a severe police crackdown now taking place, with police using batons, water cannons and tear gas to disperse the protesters. A media clampdown is also taking shape with reports that Twitter is down. BY all accounts, it's getting ugly in Cairo right now. All eyes on Obama then and his Sate of the Union Address tonight ...
Middle East 'Day of Rage'

It's all happening in the Middle East today as protesters take to the streets in Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia.
Perhaps the most interesting event will be the protests taking place in Egypt where the opposition aims to test the resolve of the government with what it is terming the 'Egyptian Intifada day'. So, the real question here is: If thousands of protesters do turn out and decide to take control of the streets, what will the Egyptian regime do?
Given the recent events in Tunisia it would be a safe bet to guess that Mubarak would want to would try to crush the protests as quickly as possible in a bid to stop them building any kind of momentum. However, this in itself may only escalate the situation, particularly if there are fatalities. The Mubarak regime therefore finds itself in a tricky situation and one that it is not used to: how to deal with possible mass civil disobedience.
The protests will also cause a huge dilemma for the Obama administration. The US is the primary benefactor the Mubarak regime with $1.3 billion annually in military aid. As, Shadi Hamid points in a piece in the Atlantic, 'if the army ever decides to shoot into a crowd of unarmed protesters, it will be shooting with hardware provided by the United States'. Given that unlike Tunisia, the US is a major player here, remaining silent will also cause problems.
The day of protests also marks Police Day, in celebration of an event 59 years ago when 41 police officers were killed by British forces in Ismailia after refusing to surrender to British forces. The protesters may well be hoping that Police Day may well rekindle some flames of patriotism among Egypt's police - now integral to Mubarak's oppressive regime - and that they may even join in the protests against the regime. I can't see that happening just yet but who knows, nobody predicted events in Tunisia.
Palestine papers: the fallout begins...

Just a quick one here as the fallout continues surrounding the leaking of official documents pertaining to the Peace Process.
At present all sides appear (including the Israelis) to be digging in with the PA accusing AL-Jazeera of deliberately attempting to divide the Palestinian people and, in effect, aiding the Zionist cause. This is not the first time AL-Jazeera has been accused of being a mouthpiece for Zionism.
This conspiracy theory has been doing the rounds in the Middle East for many years, and usually resurfaces every time the channel crosses the numerous 'red lines' and makes life uncomfortable for America's allies in the region. I have even heard this line spouted by high level diplomats in the region who have assured me that Qatar's ruler, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 'takes regular weekend holidays at his villas in Israel' and is beyond doubt 'in league with the Israelis'. Personally, I have no way of verifying whether the Emir does own property in Israel or holidays there but the level of paranoia directed towards AL-Jazeera by America's allies in the region is palpable and growing.
The latest revelations come directly on the back of the channel's rolling coverage of the Tunisian protests and may well have been released to maximise effect. Does AL-Jazeera have a tendency to hype-up news stories? I would say yes it does, but what news provider doesn't? Does AL-Jazeera have a particular axe to grind? I would also say yes to this also, but then again what news organisation doesn't? Is it professional? Not always, particularly the Arabic version. Is it objective? Again, not always, and despite the conspiracy theories more often than not has a pro-Palestinian bias with presenters often weighing in on the side of commentators supporting the Palestinian perspective. But let's not forget, AJE is the only English global satellite channel reporting extensively from the Middle East and in doing so countering the main Western media coverage (CNN, BBC) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is weak to say the least and more often than not lacks context and reflects Israeli perspectives.
Strangely, the channel finds itself being vilified as a propaganda machine for Islamist terrorism, a mouthpiece for Osama bin Laden and now an agent of Zionism. However, in reality AL-Jazeera is as despised in the palaces of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan as it is in the White House and Tel Aviv (unlike the Arabs, the Israelis have never shut down its operations). The truth is, of course, that AL-Jazeera promotes a level of free speech unheard of in the Arab world and backed by the wealth of Qatar's abundant energy resources is not beholden to any other state.
Back to the Palestine papers. Amjad Attallah has in interesting take on events here. Also, in a rare moment of good news for the Palestinian people, Peru yesterday became the 7th South American country to recognise a Palestinian state, and did so in the face of considerable US pressure.
P.S. the top quote so far from the Palestine papers goes to former Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni: 'I am a lawyer ... but I am against law'. classic!
Monday, January 24, 2011
Palestine papers

AFP
So here we have it: the truth at last about the so-called Peace Process. The story of the Emperor's clothes comes to mind. Al-Jazeera has obtained more than 1,600 internal documents (shared with the Guardian) from a decade of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The papers reveal what many of us have known for a long time: the total intransigence of Israel and its American ally, and the absolute weakness of the PA. So far, the main highlights include:
- the scale of concessions made by the PA, including on the right of return, the annexation of nearly all East Jerusalem settlements and a demilitarised state
- the level of cooperation between Israel's security services and the PA
- the absolute intransigence of Israeli negotiators; and
- the total myth of the US as an 'honest broker'.
The documents blow a massive hole right through the Israeli propaganda machine and the oft- repeated mantra 'that there is no Palestinian partner'. As the paper's reveal , not only was there a Palestinian partner (though the Israelis were doing everything to destroy this partner, the whole PA infrastructure and bolster the more radical elements), but this partner was willing to sell out on virtually every Palestinian right in a desperate bid to reach an agreement with the Israelis.
The fallout from this is not likely to have much of an impact on Israel, which has remained true to its goal of pretending to go along with the Peace Process in order to buy time to eat up more Palestinian land and create facts on the ground. This was always and remains the Israeli plan, whilst at the same time using the largely corrupt PA to do its dirty work in the occupied territories and provide a cloak of legitimacy. However, with the publication of these papers the game is surely up.For years now Arab diplomats in the Middle East have talked off-the-record about 'managing the peace process'. The process became the goal in itself and all those partaking in it have been rewarded with inflows of foreign aid and US $$$ and military support, particularly to cash-strapped Egypt and Jordan. The Peace Process also offered some kind of hope to the Palestinians and the 5m million refugees living in often squalid conditions in neighbouring states. That hope was seen as important as without it the politicians feared the whole region would descend into chaos.
So where now for the PA? Surely the current Palestinian leaders are finished and Hamas' strategy of no negotiation with Israel has been vindicated. And where now for the region's leaders? particularly Abdullah II of Jordan who has staked so much of his legitimacy on the peace process (and with a majority Palestinian population) only for his people to now (though most already knew) finally have it in writing that the entire process has been little more than a sham.
Follow live updates and PA denials here.
Thursday, January 20, 2011
Despots old and new
I have been unable to post for a few days as my time has been taken up with a project at the University of Manchester to digitise a 14th/5th Century Qur'an. Interested parties can read more about this project here. The Qur’an in question is one of the largest in the world and was commissioned by Sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri , the last but one of the Mamluk Sultans who eventually met his death in 1516 in Syria fighting the Ottomans and never got to be buried in his lavish Mausoleum in Cairo (on which he spent a tidy fortune). In the chronicles of Ibn Iyas, al-Ghuri is portrayed as an arbitrary despot who tortured his subjects and others at will. Not much changes it seems.
Now back to politics and Tunisia. I'm not going to say too much right now as the political tussles begin to unfold but rather highlight a couple of articles on the subject. Nadia Marzouki has an interesting and fairly lengthy article in MERIP in which she analyses the reasons behind the uprising, as well as recalling ironically some of the praise over recent years that has been heaped on Tunisia by Western powers and international financial institutions for its ‘Miracle’ economic progress. Dealing with the combination of factors that led to the uprising she says:
“The corruption and bad governance of Ben Ali’s reign have contributed to the increasing pauperization of this middle class and the dramatic rise of unemployment, especially among university graduates. Forty-six percent of youth who have university degrees, as Bouazizi did, have no jobs commensurate with their education. The avarice of the president and his wife’s relatives gradually alienated Tunisian and foreign investors, who were tired of paying a tithe to the reigning family, and preferred relocating to the more transparent Gulf countries. The so-called economic success story of Tunisia became a nightmare for the Tunisian people.”
Meanwhile , Foreign Policy has just posted and article titled ‘ The next Tunisias', listing 5 states at risk of a Tunisian-style revolution. Make what you will of it. Personally, I would say the most likely may be Algeria, but things there are complicated by the Islamist presence and the recent civil war. I noticed Jordan is also on the list and the above quote from Marzouki in relation to the shrinking middle class rings true there also. But I think the buck stops there. Although socio-economic and demographic factors are slowly tearing away at Abdullah II's support base, a Tunisian-style uprising is still a fair way off. The King retains the support of the military and intelligence services and has distributed funds just about well enough to keep the ship sailing. The situation there is also highly complicated by the Palestine issue. Nonetheless, the FP piece makes interesting reading with some nice comparisons.
Changing tack slightly, Brian Whittaker has different take on the Tunisian issue in the Guardian and on his blog poses the question: Is the uprising a sign of a post-Islamist Middle East? I wouldn't quite count on that just yet but nevertheless what took place in Tunisia did go some way to countering the usual stereotype of the Islamist bogeyman lurking in the background waiting to take power and impose Sharia law by force. It also represents a green shoot that will hopefully grow - but is still just a green shoot.
If anything, the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of Islamism across the region (not just at the political level but even more so at the personal level) and the fact remains that Islamist organisations/political parties, both legal and illegal, remain the only real organised alternative in the majority of the Arab states (that does not mean they have widespread appeal) to the status quo. They have simply had a better head start as they were able to successfully fill the void - sometimes encouraged by the ruling regimes - left by the absence of political parties which were easier for the regime to crack down on.
Here are some interesting video clips on the issue of political reform in the Arab world with former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher.
Now back to politics and Tunisia. I'm not going to say too much right now as the political tussles begin to unfold but rather highlight a couple of articles on the subject. Nadia Marzouki has an interesting and fairly lengthy article in MERIP in which she analyses the reasons behind the uprising, as well as recalling ironically some of the praise over recent years that has been heaped on Tunisia by Western powers and international financial institutions for its ‘Miracle’ economic progress. Dealing with the combination of factors that led to the uprising she says:
“The corruption and bad governance of Ben Ali’s reign have contributed to the increasing pauperization of this middle class and the dramatic rise of unemployment, especially among university graduates. Forty-six percent of youth who have university degrees, as Bouazizi did, have no jobs commensurate with their education. The avarice of the president and his wife’s relatives gradually alienated Tunisian and foreign investors, who were tired of paying a tithe to the reigning family, and preferred relocating to the more transparent Gulf countries. The so-called economic success story of Tunisia became a nightmare for the Tunisian people.”
Meanwhile , Foreign Policy has just posted and article titled ‘ The next Tunisias', listing 5 states at risk of a Tunisian-style revolution. Make what you will of it. Personally, I would say the most likely may be Algeria, but things there are complicated by the Islamist presence and the recent civil war. I noticed Jordan is also on the list and the above quote from Marzouki in relation to the shrinking middle class rings true there also. But I think the buck stops there. Although socio-economic and demographic factors are slowly tearing away at Abdullah II's support base, a Tunisian-style uprising is still a fair way off. The King retains the support of the military and intelligence services and has distributed funds just about well enough to keep the ship sailing. The situation there is also highly complicated by the Palestine issue. Nonetheless, the FP piece makes interesting reading with some nice comparisons.
Changing tack slightly, Brian Whittaker has different take on the Tunisian issue in the Guardian and on his blog poses the question: Is the uprising a sign of a post-Islamist Middle East? I wouldn't quite count on that just yet but nevertheless what took place in Tunisia did go some way to countering the usual stereotype of the Islamist bogeyman lurking in the background waiting to take power and impose Sharia law by force. It also represents a green shoot that will hopefully grow - but is still just a green shoot.
If anything, the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of Islamism across the region (not just at the political level but even more so at the personal level) and the fact remains that Islamist organisations/political parties, both legal and illegal, remain the only real organised alternative in the majority of the Arab states (that does not mean they have widespread appeal) to the status quo. They have simply had a better head start as they were able to successfully fill the void - sometimes encouraged by the ruling regimes - left by the absence of political parties which were easier for the regime to crack down on.
Here are some interesting video clips on the issue of political reform in the Arab world with former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Tunisia
A bitter taste lingers ...
Well, the events of the past few days in Tunisia have certainly been riveting and at times I could hardly drag myself away from al-Jazeera's rolling coverage (the channel's Qatari backers have no need to fear a similar unrest - until the energy resources run dry, that is).
But what will this so-called Jasmine revolution (and a lot of people have died, let's not forget) actually achieve? I don't want to be too pessimistic here. What has taken place in Tunisia - i.e. the Arab street standing up to and riding itself of a brutal dictator - is a truly momentous event and will cause some sleepless nights in the palaces of the Arab world.
However, as the dust begins to settle (and it's far from settling) the Tunisian people are slowly beginning to assess the new political landscape, and it's proving all too deja vu. Ben Ali in 1987 became president in much the same way that Ghannouchi did on Friday. But instead of stepping aside he held on to power. Furthermore, the new National Unity Government unveiled on Monday, is looking too much like the old one minus Ben Ali. Though a few token posts have been allocated to opposition figures such as the PDP's Najib Chebbi, at first glance what we see is a strong representation of the old guard and not much of the new. The real seats of power in the new Ghannouchi government (Ben Ali's right-hand man in the Constitutional Democratic Rally) -the foreign, interior, defence and finance portfolios have remained unchanged.
This begs two questions: firstly, is Ghannouchi really committed to political reform? Secondly and more importantly, is the opposition likely to accept the new government based on a constitution that was tailored to serve the interests of an authoritarian regime? I suspect not. One of Tunisia's key opposition figures, Moncef Marzouki, on Monday branded the new government a "masquerade" dominated by supporters of Ben Ali. But given that the new government appears to have the backing of the military and may be able to co-opt some opposition figures (though the Islamists appear to have been firmly sidelined) where does the Jasmine revolution go from here?
The problem facing Tunisia right now is one that is largely characteristic of the entire Arab world: decades of political repression have led to a fractured and weak opposition with no real leadership or set of coherent policies or unifying programme. The Arab street has risen up and made it's voice heard, but how can that translate into real reforms when political parties remain so weak and divided? At present, the country's constitution provides the only framework for the interim government and the opposition to negotiate but it was carefully crafted to ensure the dominance of previous leaders and their cronies. Elections must be called within 60 days and during this period no changes are permissible to the constitution. The short time frame in effect assures that the opposition has no time to organise and therefore benefits the ruling party.
Back in 1987, Ben Ali came to power in a similar way to the new president and Tunisians don't want to be fooled again, but they may well be.
Well, the events of the past few days in Tunisia have certainly been riveting and at times I could hardly drag myself away from al-Jazeera's rolling coverage (the channel's Qatari backers have no need to fear a similar unrest - until the energy resources run dry, that is).
But what will this so-called Jasmine revolution (and a lot of people have died, let's not forget) actually achieve? I don't want to be too pessimistic here. What has taken place in Tunisia - i.e. the Arab street standing up to and riding itself of a brutal dictator - is a truly momentous event and will cause some sleepless nights in the palaces of the Arab world.
However, as the dust begins to settle (and it's far from settling) the Tunisian people are slowly beginning to assess the new political landscape, and it's proving all too deja vu. Ben Ali in 1987 became president in much the same way that Ghannouchi did on Friday. But instead of stepping aside he held on to power. Furthermore, the new National Unity Government unveiled on Monday, is looking too much like the old one minus Ben Ali. Though a few token posts have been allocated to opposition figures such as the PDP's Najib Chebbi, at first glance what we see is a strong representation of the old guard and not much of the new. The real seats of power in the new Ghannouchi government (Ben Ali's right-hand man in the Constitutional Democratic Rally) -the foreign, interior, defence and finance portfolios have remained unchanged.
This begs two questions: firstly, is Ghannouchi really committed to political reform? Secondly and more importantly, is the opposition likely to accept the new government based on a constitution that was tailored to serve the interests of an authoritarian regime? I suspect not. One of Tunisia's key opposition figures, Moncef Marzouki, on Monday branded the new government a "masquerade" dominated by supporters of Ben Ali. But given that the new government appears to have the backing of the military and may be able to co-opt some opposition figures (though the Islamists appear to have been firmly sidelined) where does the Jasmine revolution go from here?
The problem facing Tunisia right now is one that is largely characteristic of the entire Arab world: decades of political repression have led to a fractured and weak opposition with no real leadership or set of coherent policies or unifying programme. The Arab street has risen up and made it's voice heard, but how can that translate into real reforms when political parties remain so weak and divided? At present, the country's constitution provides the only framework for the interim government and the opposition to negotiate but it was carefully crafted to ensure the dominance of previous leaders and their cronies. Elections must be called within 60 days and during this period no changes are permissible to the constitution. The short time frame in effect assures that the opposition has no time to organise and therefore benefits the ruling party.
Back in 1987, Ben Ali came to power in a similar way to the new president and Tunisians don't want to be fooled again, but they may well be.
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